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Summary
Operation Iraqi Freedom accomplished a  long-standing U.S. objective, the
overthrow of Saddam Hussein, but replacing his regime with a stable, moderate,
democratic political structure has run into significant  difficulty.  That outcome
would contribute to preventing Iraq from becoming a sanctuary for terrorists, a key
recommendation of the September 11 Commission report (Chapter 12, Section 2).
During the 1990s, U.S. efforts to change the regime covertly failed because of limited
U.S. commitment, disorganization of the Iraqi opposition, and the vigilance of Iraq’s
several overlapping  security services.  Previous U.S. Administrations had ruled out
a  U.S. military invasion to change the regime, believing such action would be risky
and that Iraq did not necessarily pose a level of threat that would justify doing so.
President George W. Bush characterized Iraq as a grave potential threat to the United
States because of its refusal to abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
programs and its potential to transfer WMD to terrorist groups.  After a November
2002-March 2003  round of U.N. WMD inspections in which Iraq’s cooperation was
mixed, on March 19, 2003, the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom to
disarm Iraq and change its regime.  The regime fell on April 9, 2003.  
In the months prior to the war, the Administration stressed that regime change
through U.S.-led military action would yield benefits beyond disarmament and
reduction of support for terrorism, benefits such as  liberation of the Iraqi people
from an oppressive regime and promotion of  democracy throughout  the Middle
East.  Escalating resistance to the U.S.-led occupation (April 2003-June 2004)
complicated U.S. efforts to build democracy and to establish legitimate and effective
Iraqi political and security bodies.  Partly in an effort to reduce U.S. casualties and
satisfy Iraqi demands for an end to coalition occupation, the United States decided
to accelerate the hand over of  sovereignty.  An interim government was named on
June 1, 2004, and the handover took place on June 28, 2004.  Current plans are to for
elections for a transition  government by January 31, 2005, with votes on a permanent
constitution by October 31, 2005, and for a permanent government by December 15,
2005, although virtually all of these deadlines are to some degree jeopardized by the
persistent insurgency.  
The Bush Administration asserts that U.S. policy in Iraq will ultimately succeed
as U.S. trainers and the interim Iraqi government build new Iraqi security bodies.
Some believe the United States should add troops to the current level of about
140,000, plus about 24,000 foreign military personnel, and should eliminate pockets
of insurgent control.  Others believe the United States needs to take new steps to
recruit major international force contributors, and yet some others believe that the
United States should pull out of Iraq.  
This report will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS
Report RL31833, Iraq:  Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance.
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Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and 
Post-Saddam Governance
The United States did not remove Iraq’s Saddam Hussein from power in the
course of the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and his regime unexpectedly survived post-war
uprisings by Iraq’s Shiites and Kurds.  Subsequently, the United States sought to
remove Saddam from power by supporting dissidents inside Iraq, although changing
Iraq’s regime was not U.S. declared policy until 1998.  In November 1998, amid a
crisis with Iraq over U.N. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspections, the
Clinton Administration stated that the United States would promote a change of
regime.  A regime change policy was endorsed by the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-
338, October 31, 1998).  Bush Administration officials emphasized regime change
as the cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Iraq shortly after the September 11, 2001,
attacks.  Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched on March 19, 2003, and had
effectively deposed Saddam Hussein by April 9, 2003. 
The Bush Administration’s stated goal is to transform Iraq  into a democracy
that could be a model for the rest of the region and would prevent Iraq from
becoming a safehaven for Islamic or other terrorists.  Iraq has not had experience
with a democratic form of government, although parliamentary elections were held
during the period of British rule under a League of Nations mandate (1920-1932).
Iraq, which became independent in 1932, was governed by kings from the Hashemite
dynasty during 1921-1958, with substantial British direction and influence.1
Members of the Hashemite dynasty continue to rule in neighboring Jordan.  Iraq’s
first Hashemite king was Faysal bin Hussein, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, who
led the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire.  Faysal ruled Iraq as King Faysal I
and was succeeded by his son, Ghazi (1933-1939).  Ghazi was succeeded by his son,
Faysal II, who ruled until the military coup of Abd al-Karim al-Qasim on July 14,
1958.  Qasim was ousted in February 1963 by a Baath Party - military alliance.  Also
in 1963, the Baath Party took power in Syria.  It still rules there today, although there
was strong rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi Baath regimes during Saddam’s time
in power.  
One of the Baath Party’s allies in the February 1963 coup in Iraq was Abd al-
Salam al-Arif.  In November 1963, Arif purged the Baath, including Baathist Prime
Minister Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and instituted direct military rule.  Arif was killed
in a helicopter crash in 1966 and was replaced by his elder brother, Abd al-Rahim al-
Arif, who ruled until the Baath Party coup of July 1968.  Following the Baath seizure,
Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, a military figure, returned to government as President of Iraq
and Saddam Hussein, a civilian, became the second most powerful leader as Vice
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Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council.  In that position, Saddam
developed and oversaw a system of overlapping security services to monitor loyalty
among the population and within Iraq’s institutions, including the military.  On July
17, 1979, the aging al-Bakr resigned at Saddam’s urging, and Saddam became
President of Iraq.
Major Anti-Saddam Groups and 
Past Regime Change Efforts
Prior to the launching on January 16, 1991 of Operation Desert Storm, which
reversed Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush called
on the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam.  Within days of the end of the Gulf war
(February 28, 1991), opposition Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq and Kurdish factions
in northern Iraq, emboldened by the regime’s defeat and the hope of U.S. support,
launched significant rebellions.  The revolt in southern Iraq reached the suburbs of
Baghdad, but the Republican Guard forces, composed mainly of  regime loyalists,
had survived the war largely intact, having been withdrawn from battle prior to the
U.S. ground offensive, and it defeated the Shiite rebels by mid-March 1991.  Many
Shiites blamed the United States for standing aside as the regime retaliated against
those who participated in the rebellion.  Kurds, benefitting from a U.S.-led “no fly
zone” established in April 1991, drove Iraqi troops out of much of northern Iraq and
subsequently remained relatively autonomous. 
According to press reports, about two months after the failure of the Shiite
uprising, President George H.W. Bush  forwarded to Congress an intelligence finding
stating that the United States would undertake efforts to promote a military coup
against Saddam Hussein; a reported $15 million to $20 million was allocated for that
purpose.  The Administration apparently believed — and this view apparently was
shared by many experts and U.S. officials — that a coup by elements within the
current regime could produce a favorable new government without fragmenting Iraq.
Many observers, however, including neighboring governments, feared that Shiite and
Kurdish groups, if they ousted Saddam, would divide Iraq into warring ethnic and
tribal groups, opening Iraq to influence from neighboring Iran, Turkey, and Syria.
Reports in July 1992 of a serious but unsuccessful coup attempt suggested that
the U.S. strategy might ultimately succeed.  However, there was disappointment
within the George H.W. Bush Administration that the coup had failed and a decision
was made to shift the U.S. approach from promotion of a coup to supporting the
diverse opposition groups that had led the post-war rebellions.  At the same time, the
Kurdish, Shiite, and other opposition elements were coalescing into a broad and
diverse movement that appeared to be gaining support internationally.  This
opposition coalition was seen as providing a vehicle for the United States to build a
viable overthrow strategy.  Congress more than doubled the budget  for covert




3 The Iraqi National Congress and the International Community.  Document provided by
INC representatives, Feb. 1993.  
The following sections discuss organizations and personalities that were part of
the U.S. effort to change Iraq’s regime during the 1990s, as well as some that were
not directly associated with those efforts but are now emerging as major players.
Iraqi National Congress (INC)/Ahmad Chalabi.  After 1991, the growing
exile opposition coalition took shape in an organization called  the Iraqi National
Congress (INC).  The INC was formally constituted when the two main Kurdish
militias, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK), participated in a June 1992 meeting in Vienna of dozens of opposition
groups.  In October 1992, major Shiite Islamist groups came into the coalition when
the INC met in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq.  
The INC appeared viable because it brought under one banner varying Iraqi
ethnic groups and diverse political ideologies,  including nationalists, ex-military
officers, and defectors from the Baath Party.  The Kurds provided the INC with a
source of  armed force and a presence on Iraqi territory.  Its constituent groups
publicly united around a platform that appeared to match U.S. values and interests,
including human rights, democracy, pluralism, “federalism,” the preservation of
Iraq’s  territorial integrity, and compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions
on Iraq.3  However, many observers doubted its commitment to democracy, because
most of  its groups have an authoritarian internal structure, and because of  tensions
among its varied ethnic groups and ideologies.  The INC’s first Executive Committee
consisted of KDP leader Masud Barzani, ex-Baath Party and military official Hassan
Naqib, and moderate Shiite cleric Mohammad Bahr al-Ulum.  
The INC and its leader, Ahmad Chalabi, have been controversial in the United
States since the INC was formed.  The State Department and Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) have, by many accounts,  believed the INC had little popularity inside
Iraq.  In the George W. Bush Administration, numerous press reports indicated that
the Defense Department and office of Vice President Cheney believed the INC might
be able to lead a post-Saddam regime.  
Ahmad Chalabi and Other INC Figures.  When the INC was formed, its
Executive Committee selected Chalabi, a secular Shiite Muslim from a prominent
banking family, to run the INC on a daily basis.  Chalabi, who is about 60 years old,
was educated in the United States (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) as a
mathematician.  His father was president of the Senate in the monarchy that was
overthrown in the 1958 military coup, and the family fled to Jordan.  He taught math
at the American University of Beirut in 1977 and, in 1978, he founded the Petra Bank
in Jordan.  He later ran afoul of Jordanian authorities on charges of embezzlement
and he left Jordan, possibly with some help from members of Jordan’s royal family,
in 1989.  In April 1992, he was convicted in absentia of embezzling $70 million from
the bank and sentenced to 22 years in prison.  The Jordanian government
subsequently repaid depositors a total of  $400 million.  Chalabi maintains that the
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Jordanian government was pressured by Iraq to turn against him, and he asserts that
he has since rebuilt ties to the Jordanian government.  In April 2003, senior Jordanian
officials, including King Abdullah, publicly called Chalabi “divisive;” stopping short
of saying he would be unacceptable as leader of Iraq.
Chalabi’s critics acknowledge that, despite allegations about his methods, he
was single-minded in his determination to overthrow Saddam Hussein.  He was
supported by some Administration officials, particularly in the Department of
Defense, who most supported changing Iraq’s regime by force.  On April 6, 2003,
Chalabi and about 700 INC fighters (“Free Iraqi Forces”) were airlifted by the U.S.
military from their base in the north to the Nasiriya area, purportedly to help stabilize
civil affairs in southern Iraq, later deploying to Baghdad and other parts of Iraq.
After establishing his headquarters in Baghdad, Chalabi tried to build support by
searching for fugitive members of the former regime and arranging for U.S. military
forces in Iraq to provide security or other benefits to his potential supporters. (The
Free Iraqi Forces accompanying Chalabi were disbanded following the U.S. decision
in mid-May 2003 to disarm independent militias.)  
In the post-Saddam administrations, Chalabi was selected to the Governing
Council (IGC) and was one of the nine that rotates its presidency; he was president
of the IGC during the month of September 2003.  He headed the IGC committee on
“de-Baathification,” although his vigilance in purging former Baathists was slowed
by U.S. officials in early 2004.  His appointments came despite the lack of  an
evident large following among Iraqis, and, in early 2004, Chalabi attempted to build
a popular following by criticizing U.S. policies.  These positions ran Chalabi afoul
of some of his supporters in the Bush Administration.
The deterioration in Chalabi’s relationship with the United States was
demonstrated when Iraqi police, backed by U.S. troops, raided INC headquarters in
Baghdad on May 20, 2004.  Among the allegations in question were that Chalabi had
passed information to Iran that the United States had broken Iranian intelligence
codes;4 that INC members had been involved in kidnaping or currency fraud; or that
the INC had failed to cooperate with an Iraqi investigation of the U.N. “oil-for-food
program.”  Another possible area of inquiry has been whether Chalabi purposely
provided false information to the United States on Iraq’s pre-war WMD in an effort
to build U.S. support for the war.  Some accuse Chalabi of helping steer
reconstruction work to relatives and business associates.5  In the raid, the
investigators seized computers and files that the INC had captured from various Iraqi
ministries upon the fall of Saddam’s regime.  Demonstrating the degree to which
Chalabi has become estranged from the United States and the interim Iraqi
government, on August 8, 2004, an Iraqi judge issued a warrant for Chalabi’s arrest
on counterfeiting charges, and for his nephew Salem Chalabi’s arrest for the murder
of an Iraqi finance ministry official.  Salem had headed the tribunal trying Saddam
Hussein and his associates, but his role on that issue ended after the warrant was
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issued.  Both were out of the country but returned to fight the charges.  Upon his
return to Iraq in mid-August, Chalabi met with Iraqi investigators and the case was
subsequently dropped.  In an effort to build his political stature without U.S. support,
since mid-2004 Chalabi has allied with radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr (see
below) in an attempt to form a power bloc outside the interim government.
INC Funding.  According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, in a report
dated April 2004,6 the INC’s  Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF)
received $32.65 million in U.S. funding (Economic Support Funds, ESF) in five
agreements with the State Department during 2000-2003.  Most of the funds —
separate from drawdowns of U.S. military equipment and training under the separate
“Iraq Liberation Act,” see below — were for the INC to run its offices in
Washington, London, Tehran, Damascus, Prague, and Cairo, and to operate its Al
Mutamar (the “Conference”) newspaper and Liberty TV.  In addition, in August
2002, the State Department and Defense Department agreed that the Defense
Department would take over funding ($335,000 per month) for the INC’s
“Information Collection Program” to collect intelligence on Iraq; the State
Department wanted to end its funding of that program because of questions about the
INC’s credibility and the propriety of its use of U.S. funds.  The INC continued to
receive these funds even after Saddam Hussein was overthrown,7 and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard  Meyers said on May 20, 2004, that the INC
had provided some information that had saved the lives of U.S. soldiers.  However,
with controversy over the quality of the INC’s pre-war intelligence on Iraqi WMD
escalating, the Defense Department officials announced a halt to the funding on May
18, 2004, effective at the June 2004 sovereignty handover.
Some U.S. funds for the INC were specifically earmarked.  The FY2001 foreign
aid appropriation (H.R. 4811, P.L. 106-429, November 6, 2000) earmarked $25
million in ESF for “programs benefitting the Iraqi people,” of which at least $12
million was for the INC to distribute humanitarian aid in Iraq; $6 million was for INC
broadcasting; and $2 million was for war crimes issues.  (The appropriation stated
that the remaining $5 million could be used to provide additional ESF to the seven
groups then eligible to receive assistance under the Iraq Liberation Act, see below.)
In September 2000, the Clinton Administration agreed to provide the INC with $4
million (from FY1999 ESF appropriated for the Iraqi opposition) to develop a plan
to distribute humanitarian aid in Iraq and to gather information on Iraqi war crimes.
However, three days before leaving office, the Clinton Administration issued a
required report to Congress stating that any INC effort to distribute humanitarian aid
in areas of Iraq under Baghdad’s control would be fraught with security risks to the
INC, to Iraqi recipients of such aid, and to any relief distributors with which the INC
would contract.8  In February 2001, the Bush Administration adopted a similar
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policy: supporting INC information gathering but opposing its distribution of
humanitarian aid inside Iraq.
In August 2001, the INC began satellite television broadcasts into Iraq, from
London, called Liberty TV.  The station was funded by the FY2001 ESF appropriated
by Congress, with start-up costs of $1 million and an estimated additional $2.7
million per year in operating costs.9  However, Liberty TV’s service was sporadic due
to funding disruptions resulting from the INC’s refusal to accept some State
Department decisions on how the INC was to use U.S. funds.10  (A table on U.S.
appropriations for the Iraqi opposition, including the INC, is an appendix).
Iraq National Accord (INA)/Iyad al-Allawi.  The Iraq National Accord
(INA) was founded just after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait.  Supported initially by
Saudi Arabia, the INA consisted of defectors from Iraq’s Baath Party, military, and
security services who were perceived as having ties to disgruntled officials in those
organizations.  During the mid-1990s, the INA reportedly had an operational backing
from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).11 
The INA has been headed since 1990 by Dr. Iyad al-Allawi, who that year broke
with another INA leader, Salah Umar al-Tikriti.  Allawi is a former Baathist who,
according to some reports, helped Saddam Hussein silence Iraqi dissidents in Europe
in the mid-1970s.12  Allawi is about 58 years old (born 1946 in Baghdad).  After
falling out with Saddam in the mid-1970s, he became a neurologist and was president
of the Iraqi Student Union in Europe.  He survived an assassination attempt in
London in 1978, allegedly by Iraq’s agents.  He is a secular Shiite Muslim, but most
of the members of the INA are Sunni Muslims.  Although Allawi no longer considers
himself a Baath Party member, he is not known to have openly denounced the
original tenets of Baathism, a pan-Arab multi-ethnic movement founded in the 1940s
by Lebanese Christian political philosopher Michel Aflaq. 
Although it cooperated with the INC at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom,
there is a history of friction between the INA and the INC.  Allawi’s  INA has ex-
Baathists in it, and Allawi has argued for retaining some members of the former
regime in official positions, a position that is anathema to the INC.  Like the INC, the
INA does not appear to have a mass following in Iraq.  Allawi  was part of the major-
party grouping that agitated for the formation of the IGC, and he was named to the
IGC and to its  rotating presidency.  He was president during October 2003.  On June
1, 2004, after being nominated by the IGC, he became prime minister  of  the interim
government; he assumed formal power upon the June 28, 2004 sovereignty handover.
CRS-7
Major Kurdish Organizations/KDP and PUK.  The Kurds, among the
most pro-U.S. of all the groups in Iraq, do not express ambitions to govern Arab Iraq,
but they have a historic fear of persecution by the Arab majority and want to preserve
the autonomy they have experienced since the 1991 Gulf war.  (The Kurds are mostly
Sunni Muslims, but they are not ethnic Arabs.)  In committing to the concept of
“federalism,” the 1992  INC  platform assured the Kurds autonomy in a post-Saddam
Iraq.  Turkey, which has a sizable Kurdish population in the areas bordering northern
Iraq, particularly fears that the Kurds want outright independence and that this might
touch off an effort  to unify with Kurds in neighboring countries (including Turkey)
into a broader “Kurdistan.”  
Iraq’s Kurds have fought intermittently for autonomy since their region was
incorporated into the newly formed Iraqi state after World War I.  In 1961, the KDP,
then led by founder Mullah Mustafa Barzani, current KDP leader Masud Barzani’s
father, began an insurgency that has continued until the fall of Saddam Hussein.  At
times, the insurgency was suspended during  autonomy negotiations with Baghdad.
Masud Barzani’s brother, Idris, commanded Kurdish forces against Baghdad during
the Iran-Iraq war but was killed in that war.  The PUK, headed by Jalal Talabani, split
off from the KDP in 1965; the PUK’s members are generally more well-educated,
urbane, and left-leaning than those of the KDP.  Together, the PUK and KDP have
about 75,000 “peshmergas” (fighters); some are trained in conventional tactics.  
In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf war, the KDP and the PUK agreed in May
1992 to share power after parliamentary and executive elections.  In May 1994,
tensions between them flared into clashes, and the KDP turned to Baghdad for
backing.  In August 1996, Iraqi forces, at the KDP’s invitation, militarily helped the
KDP capture PUK-held Irbil, seat of the Kurdish regional government.  With U.S.
mediation, the Kurdish parties agreed on October 23, 1996, to a cease-fire and the
establishment of a 400-man peace monitoring force composed mainly of Turkomens
(75% of the force).  The United States funded the force with FY1997 funds of $3
million for  peacekeeping  (Section 451 of the Foreign Assistance Act), plus about
$4 million in DOD drawdowns (vehicles and communications gear), under Section
552 of the FAA.  Also set up was a peace supervisory group consisting of the United
States, Britain, Turkey, the PUK, the KDP, and Iraqi Turkomens. 
A tenuous cease-fire held after November 1997, helped by the September 1998
“Washington Agreement” to work toward resolving the main outstanding issues
(sharing of revenues and control over the Kurdish regional government).
Reconciliation efforts showed substantial progress in 2002 as the Kurds perceived
that the United States might act to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein.  On
October 4, 2002, the two Kurdish factions jointly reconvened the Kurdish regional
parliament for the first time since the 1994 clashes.  In June 2002, the United States
gave the Kurds $3.1 million in new assistance to further the reconciliation process.
In post-Saddam Iraq, both Barzani and Talabani were placed on the IGC, and
both were part of the Council’s rotating presidency.  Talabani was IGC president
during November 2003, and Barzani led the body in April 2004.  Neither leader is in
the interim government, but their top aides and former representatives in
Washington, Hoshyar Zibari (KDP) and Barham Salih (PUK), are high-ranking
officials.  The Kurdish parties have negotiated with U.S. authorities to maintain
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substantial autonomy in northern Iraq in a sovereign, post-occupation Iraq — a
demand largely enshrined in the Transitional Administrative Law (interim
constitution, see below.)  The Kurds’ uncertainty about the eventual shape of the
post-Saddam political structure has caused the KDP and PUK to combine their
political resources and to re-establish joint governance of the Kurdish regions.
Ansar al-Islam/Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.  One organization begun by Kurds,
Ansar al-Islam, has become decidedly anti-U.S.  Ansar al-Islam, which is named by
the State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), originated in the
mid-1990s as a Kurdish Islamic faction called the Islamic Movement of Iraqi
Kurdistan (IMIK).  Based in Halabja, the IMIK publicized the effects of Baghdad’s
March 1988 chemical attack on that city.  
A radical faction of the IMIK split off in 1998, calling itself the Jund al-Islam
(Army of Islam).  It later changed its name to Ansar al-Islam (Partisans of Islam),
first led by Mullah Krekar.  Krekar reportedly had once studied under Shaikh
Abdullah al-Azzam, an Islamic theologian of Palestinian origin who was the spiritual
mentor of Osama bin Laden.  Ansar reportedly agreed to host in its northern Iraq
enclave Al Qaeda fighters, mostly of Arab origin, who had fled the U.S.-led war in
Afghanistan in 2001.  This Arab contingent was led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a 37-
year-old Jordanian Arab who reputedly fought in Afghanistan during the 1980s
alongside other Arab volunteers for the “jihad” against the Soviet Union.  Possibly
because Ansar was largely taken over by Zarqawi and his Arab associates, Mullah
Krekar left Iraq for Norway, where he was detained in August 2002,  arrested again
in early January 2004, and released again in February 2004.  
Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, during which its base was captured, about 600
Arab fighters lived in the Ansar al-Islam enclave, near Khurmal.13  Ansar fighters
clashed with the PUK around Halabja in December 2002, and Ansar gunmen were
allegedly responsible for an assassination attempt against PUK prime minister
Barham Salih in April 2002.  As discussed further below, Zarqawi has now become
a major insurgent leader in Iraq, using a new organizational name — Association of
Unity and Jihad.  In early 2004, U.S. forces captured a letter purportedly written by
Zarqawi asking bin Laden’s support for Zarqawi’s insurgent activities in Iraq,14 and
an Islamist website broadcast a message in October 2004 — reportedly deemed
authentic by U.S. agencies — that Zarqawi has formally allied with Al Qaeda.  
Monarchist Organizations.  One opposition group supported the return of
Iraq’s monarchy.  The Movement for Constitutional Monarchy (MCM), is led by
Sharif Ali bin al-Hussein, a relative of the Hashemite monarchs (he is a cousin of
King Faysal II, the last Iraqi monarch) that ruled Iraq from the end of World War I
until 1958.  Sharif Ali, who is about 49 and was a banker in London, claims to be the
leading heir to the former Hashemite monarchy, although there are other claimants.
The MCM was considered a small movement that could not contribute much to the
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pre-war overthrow effort, but it was part of the INC and the United States had
contacts with it.  Sharif Ali returned to Iraq on June 10, 2003, but neither he nor any
of his followers was appointed to the IGC or the interim government.
Shiite Islamist Leaders and Organizations: Ayatollah Sistani, SCIRI,
Da’wa Party, Moqtada al-Sadr, and Others.  Shiite Islamist organizations
constitute major factions in post-Saddam Iraq.  Several of them had some ties to the
United States during the regime change efforts of the 1990s, but several other Shiite
factions had no contact at all with the United States until after the fall of the regime.
Muslims constitute about 60% of the population but have been under-represented in
every Iraqi government since modern Iraq’s formation in 1920.  In an event that many
Iraqi Shiites still refer to as an example of their potential to frustrate great power
influence, Shiite Muslims led a revolt against British occupation forces in 1921.  
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.  Grand Ayatollah Sistani has emerged as
a major political force in post-Saddam Iraq, but he was largely silenced by Saddam
Hussein’s regime and was not part of U.S.-backed efforts in the 1990s to change
Iraq’s regime.  Sistani is about 75 years old and suffers from heart-related  problems
that required him to travel to the United Kingdom for medical treatment on August
6, 2004.  Sistani is the most senior of the Shiite clerics that lead the Najaf-based
“Hawza al-Ilmiyah,” a grouping of seminaries.  His status as supreme “marja-e-
taqlid,” or source of emulation, is recognized by Shiites worldwide.  Other senior
Hawza clerics include Ayatollah Mohammad Sa’id al-Hakim, uncle of the slain
leader of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) in Iraq, Mohammad
Baqr al-Hakim; Ayatollah Mohammad Isaac Fayadh, who is of Afghan origin; and
Ayatollah Bashir al-Najafi.  The large, mainstream Shiite Islamist groups SCIRI and
the Da’wa Party have aligned themselves with Sistani in post-Saddam Iraq.  
Sistani was born in Iran and studied in Qom, Iran, before relocating to Najaf at
the age of 21.  He became head of the Hawza when his mentor, Ayatollah Abol
Qasem Musavi-Khoi, died in 1992.  After spending most of the 1990s lecturing and
avoiding official scrutiny, Sistani has become more active politically since the fall
of Saddam.  In August 2004, he underwent heart surgery in Britain.
Sistani opposes a direct role for clerics in government, but believes in clerical
guidance and supervision of political leaders.  He wants Iraq to maintain its Islamic
culture and not to become secular and Westernized.  He favors modest dress for
women and curbs on alcohol consumption and Western-style music and
entertainment.  On the other hand, his career does not suggest that he favors a
repressive regime and he does not have a record of supporting extremist Shiite
organizations such as Lebanese Hizbollah.  
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).  SCIRI
is perhaps the best organized of the Shiite Islamist parties.  It was set up in 1982,
composed mainly of ex-Da’wa Party members, to increase Iranian control over Shiite
opposition movements in Iraq and the Persian Gulf states.  It was a member of the
INC in the early 1990s, but distanced itself from that organization in the mid-1990s.
Unlike most INC-affiliated parties, SCIRI had refused throughout the 1990s to work
openly with the United States or accept U.S. funds, although it had contacts with the
United States during this period.  SCIRI says it does not seek to establish an Iranian-
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style Islamic republic, but U.S. officials have expressed some  mistrust of SCIRI’s
ties to Iran and its fielding of the Badr Brigades militia.  SCIRI has echoed Ayatollah
Sistani’s insistence on timely direct elections. 
SCIRI’s former leader, Ayatollah Mohammad Baqr al-Hakim, was the choice
of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran to head an Islamic republic of Iraq.
Khomeini enjoyed the protection of Mohammad Baqr’s father, Grand Ayatollah
Muhsin al-Hakim, when Khomeini was in exile in Najaf during 1964-1978.
(Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim was head of the Hawza al-Ilmiyah at that time.)  SCIRI
and Mohammad Baqr had been based in Iraq after 1980, during a major crackdown
by Saddam Hussein, who feared that Iraqi Shiites were inspired by the Iranian Islamic
revolution to overthrow his Baathist government.  Mohammad Baqr was killed in a
car bomb in Najaf on August 29, 2003, about a month after he returned to Iraq from
exile in Iran.  Mohammad Baqr’s younger brother, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, who is a
lower ranking Shiite cleric, subsequently took over SCIRI, and served on the IGC.
He was president of the IGC during December 2003.  His key aide is Adel Abd al-
Mahdi, who was named Finance Minister in the interim government.  
 SCIRI’s Badr Brigades number about  10,000-15,000, operating in southern
Iraq.  Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, which is politically aligned with Iran’s hardliners,
trained and equipped the Badr forces during the Iran-Iraq war and helped the Badr
forces to conduct forays from Iran into southern Iraq to attack Baath Party officials
there during that conflict.  However, many Iraqi Shiites view SCIRI as an Iranian
creation, and SCIRI/Badr operations in southern Iraq during the 1980s and 1990s did
not spark broad popular unrest against the Iraqi regime.  In post-Saddam Iraq, the
Badr Brigades have formally renamed themselves the “Badr Organization,” reflecting
an effort to appear as a civilian entity.  
Da’wa Party.  The Da’wa Party, Iraq’s oldest Shiite Islamist grouping is
aligned with Sistani and SCIRI.  The Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party was founded in 1957
by a revered Iraqi Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr Al Sadr, then an
associate of Ayatollah Khomeini (and uncle of Moqtada al-Sadr).  It was the most
active Shiite opposition movement in the few years following Iran’s Islamic
revolution in February 1979; Da’wa activists conducted guerrilla attacks against the
Baathist regime and attempted assassinations of senior Iraqi leaders, including Tariq
Aziz.  Ayatollah Baqr Al Sadr  was  hung by the Iraqi regime in 1980 for the unrest,
and many other Da’wa activists were killed or imprisoned.  After the Iraqi
crackdown, many surviving Da’wa leaders moved into Iran; some subsequently
joined SCIRI, but others rejected Iranian control of Iraq’s Shiite groups and
continued to affiliate only with Da’wa.  Da’wa has fewer Shiite clerics in its ranks
than does SCIRI.  
In post-Saddam Iraq, a senior Da’wa leader,  Ibrahim Jafari, and its leader in
Basra, Abd al Zahra Mohammad (also known as Izzaddin Salim) served on the IGC.
Salim was killed on May 17, 2004 in a suicide bombing while serving as president
of the IGC.  Also on the IGC was a former Da’wa member turned human rights
activist, Muwaffaq Al-Ruba’i.  Jafari was one of the nine rotating IGC  presidents;
he was first to hold that post (August 2003), and he is now a deputy president in the
interim government.  
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The Kuwaiti branch of the Da’wa Party allegedly was responsible for a May
1985 attempted assassination of the Amir of Kuwait and the December 1983 attacks
on the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait.  The Hizballah organization in Lebanon
was founded by Lebanese clerics loyal to Ayatollah Baqr Al Sadr and Iran’s
Ayatollah Khomeini, and there continue to be personal and ideological linkages
between Lebanese Hizballah and the Da’wa Party.  The Hizballah activists who  held
U.S. hostages in that country during the 1980s often attempted to link release of the
Americans to the release of 17 Da’wa Party prisoners held by Kuwait for those
attacks in the 1980s.  Some Iraqi Da’wa members look to Lebanon’s senior Shiite
cleric Mohammed Hossein Fadlallah, who was a student and protege of Ayatollah
Mohammed Baqr Al Sadr, for spiritual guidance; Fadlallah also reportedly perceives
himself a rival of Sistani as a pre-eminent Shiite authority figure.  The linkages
between Iraqi and Lebanese Shiites could explain reports that security personnel and
other activists from Lebanese Hizballah have entered Iraq since the fall of Saddam
Hussein, although other explanations include an effort by Iran to work through
Lebanese Hizballah to build leverage in southern Iraq.15 
Moqtada al-Sadr/Mahdi Army.16  Members of the clan of the late Ayatollah
Mohammed Baqr al-Sadr, the founder of the Da’wa Party, have become highly active
in post-Saddam Iraq.  The clan was based in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s rule, and
it was repressed politically during that time.  The United States had no contact with
this clan during its 1990s efforts to change Iraq’s regime.  Although the Sadr clan has
traditionally been identified with the Da’wa Party, most members of the clan
currently do not identify with that party.  Some relatives of the clan are in Lebanon,
and the founder of what became the Shiite Amal (Hope) party in Lebanon was a Sadr
clan member, Imam Musa Sadr, who died in murky circumstances in Libya in 1978.
Another revered member of the clan, Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, and
two of his sons, were killed by Saddam’s security forces in 1999 after Ayatollah
Sadiq al-Sadr began publicly opposing Saddam’s government.  His lone surviving
son, Moqtada,  who is about 30  years old (born in 1974), has gained a prominent role
in post-Saddam Shiite politics by adopting hard-line positions against the occupation.
Moqtada al-Sadr has a significant following among poorer Shiites in southern Iraq
and a Baghdad district renamed “Sadr City,” which has a population of about 2
million.  Sadr was not represented on the IGC, nor in the interim government.  
Sadr is viewed by most  Iraqi Shiites, including Sistani, as a young radical who
lacks religious and political weight.  To compensate for his lack of religious
credentials, he has sought spiritual authority for his actions from his teacher,
Ayatollah Kazem Haeri, who lives in Qom, Iran.  Sadr believes  Sistani is too willing
to compromise with U.S. and Iraqi authorities.  There is also a personal dimension
to the rift; Sadr’s father, Mohammad  Saddiq, had been a rival of Sistani for pre-
eminent Shiite religious authority in Iraq.  The widespread view of Sadr as an
impulsive radical began on April 10, 2003, when his supporters allegedly stabbed to
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death Abd al-Majid Khoi, the son of the late Grand Ayatollah Khoi, shortly after
Khoi’s U.S.-backed return to Najaf from exile in London.  Khoi had headed the Khoi
Foundation, based in London.  Sadr subsequently used his Friday prayer sermons in
Kufa (near Najaf) and other forums to Iraqi officials as puppets of the U.S.
occupation and to call for an Islamic state.  In July 2003, Sadr began recruiting for
an Islamic army (the “Mahdi Army”), initially unarmed, to combat the U.S.
occupation. Sadr supporters published anti-U.S. newspapers and held
demonstrations.  Sadr’s first uprising began on April 4, 2004, after his paper, “Al
Hawza al-Natiqa” (the Vocal Hawza”) was closed by U.S. authorities on allegations
of incitement.  His second uprising began August 5, 2004, and many believe Sadr
does not trust the political process, including planned elections, although he now
indicates he will join the political process.  There is further discussion of these Sadr
uprisings in the section on the insurgency, below.  
 
Other Shiite Organizations and Militias.  Another Shiite Islamist
organization, the Islamic Amal (Action) Organization, has traditionally been allied
with SCIRI, although some reports in May 2004 say it might be aligning itself with
Sadr.  In the early 1980s, Islamic Amal was under the SCIRI umbrella but later broke
with it.  It is headed by Ayatollah Mohammed Taqi Modarassi, a Shiite cleric who
returned to Iraq from exile in Iran in April 2003, after Saddam Hussein’s regime fell.
Islamic Amal, the stronghold of which is Karbala, conducted attacks against Saddam
Hussein’s regime in the 1980s.  However, it does not appear to have a following
nearly as large as other Shiite Islamist groups.  Modarassi’s brother, Abd al-Hadi,
headed the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, which tried to stir up Shiite
unrest against the Bahrain regime in the 1980s and 1990s. 
A variety of press reports say that some other Shiite militias are operating in
southern Iraq.  One such militia is derived from the fighters who challenged Saddam
Hussein’s forces in the marsh areas of southern Iraq, around the town of Amara,
north of Basra.  It goes by the name Hizbollah (Party of God)-Amara, and it is headed
by marsh guerrilla leader Abdul Karim Muhammadawi, who was on the IGC.  
Schisms Among Major Factions 
The factions discussed above have a long history of friction.  In the mid-1990s,
differences among them nearly led to the collapse of the U.S. regime change effort.
As noted above, in May 1994, the KDP and the PUK began clashing with each other
over territory, customs revenues levied at border with Turkey, and control over the
Kurdish enclave’s government based in Irbil.  The infighting contributed to the defeat
of an INC offensive against Iraqi troops in March 1995; the KDP pulled out of the
offensive at the last minute.  Although it was repelled, the offensive initially overran
some of poorly motivated front-line Iraqi units.  Some INC  leaders said the battle
indicated that the INC could have succeeded militarily had it received more U.S.
assistance. 
CRS-13
17 An account of this shift in U.S. strategy is essayed in Hoagland, Jim.  “How CIA’s Secret
War On Saddam Collapsed.”  Washington Post, June 26, 1997.  
The infighting in the opposition in the mid-1990s caused the United States to
briefly revisit the “coup strategy” by renewing ties to the INA.17  A new opportunity
to pursue that strategy came in August 1995, when Saddam’s son-in-law Hussein
Kamil al-Majid — organizer of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction efforts —
defected to Jordan, suggesting that Saddam’s grip on power might be weakening.
After that defection, Jordan’s King Hussein agreed to allow the INA to operate from
Jordan.  However, the INA was ultimately penetrated by Iraq’s intelligence services
and, in June 1996, Baghdad dealt it a serious setback by arresting or executing over
100 INA sympathizers in the military. 
Baghdad went on the offensive against both the INA, as well as the INC, in mid-
1996, culminating with the August 1996 incursion into northern Iraq, at the invitation
of the KDP.  Iraq helped the KDP capture Irbil from the PUK, and Saddam’s forces
took advantage of their presence in northern Iraq to strike against the INC base in
Salahuddin, a city in northern Iraq, as well as against remaining INA operatives
throughout the north.  During the incursion in the north, Iraq reportedly executed two
hundred oppositionists and arrested 2,000 others.  The United States evacuated from
northern Iraq and eventually resettled in the United States 650 mostly INC activists.
Rebounding From Setbacks.  For the two years following the opposition’s
1996 setbacks, the Clinton Administration had little contact with the opposition.  In
those two years, the  INC, INA, and others attempted to rebuild their organizations
and their ties to each other, although with mixed success.  On February 26, 1998,
then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testified to a Senate Appropriations
subcommittee that it would be “wrong to create false or unsustainable expectations”
of the effect of U.S. support for the opposition.  
During 1997-1998, Iraq’s obstructions of U.N. weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) inspections led to growing congressional calls to overthrow Saddam,
although virtually no one in Congress or outside was advocating a U.S.-led military
invasion to accomplish that.  A congressional push for a regime change policy began
with an FY1998 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 105-174, signed May 1, 1998) that,
among other provisions, earmarked $5 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for
the opposition and $5 million for a Radio Free Iraq, under the direction of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL).  The radio service began broadcasting in October
1998, from Prague.  Of the ESF, $3 million was devoted to an overt program to
promote cohesion among the opposition factions, and to highlighting Iraqi violations
of U.N. resolutions.  The remaining $2 million was used to translate and publicize
documents of alleged Iraqi war crimes; the documents were retrieved from the
Kurdish north, placed on 176 CD-ROM diskettes, and translated and analyzed by
experts under U.S. government contract.  In subsequent years, Congress appropriated
funding for the Iraqi opposition and for war crimes issues (see appendix).  Some of
the war crimes funds went to the opposition-led INDICT (International Campaign to
Indict Iraqi War Criminals) organization for publicizing Iraqi war crimes issues.  
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Iraq Liberation Act (ILA).  A clear indication of congressional support for a
more active U.S. overthrow effort was encapsulated in another bill introduced in
1998:  the Iraq Liberation Act  (H.R. 4655, P.L. 105-338, signed October 31, 1998).
The ILA was widely interpreted as an expression of congressional support for the
concept,  advocated by Chalabi and some U.S. experts, of  promoting an insurgency
by using U.S. air-power to expand opposition-controlled territory.  President  Clinton
signed the legislation, despite doubts about the opposition’s capabilities.  The ILA:
! made the previously unstated policy of promoting regime change in
Iraq official policy by stating that it should be the policy of the
United States to “support efforts” to remove the regime headed by
Saddam Hussein.  In mid-November 1998, President Clinton
publicly articulated that regime change was a component of U.S.
policy toward Iraq.  
! gave the President authority to provide up to $97 million in defense
articles and services, as well as $2 million in broadcasting funds, to
opposition organizations to be designated by the Administration.  
! Did not specifically provide for its termination after Saddam
Hussein is removed from power, and Section 7 of the ILA provides
for continuing post-Saddam “transition assistance” to Iraqi parties
and movements with “democratic goals.” 
Operation “Desert Fox”/First ILA Designations.  Immediately after the
signing of the ILA, the series of crises over U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq came
to a head.  On December 15, 1998, U.N. inspectors were withdrawn, and a three-day
U.S. and British bombing campaign against suspected Iraqi WMD facilities followed
(Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19, 1998).  Immediately after Desert Fox,
career diplomat Frank Ricciardone was named as State Department “Coordinator for
the Transition in Iraq” — chief liaison with the opposition.  On February 5, 1999, the
President issued a determination (P.D. 99-13) that the following anti-Saddam groups
would be eligible to receive U.S. military assistance under the ILA:  the INC; the
INA; SCIRI; the KDP; the PUK; the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK);
and the pro-monarchist Movement for Constitutional Monarchy (MCM).  (Because
of its role in the eventual formation of Ansar al-Islam, the IMIK did not receive U.S.
funds after 2001, although it was not formally taken off the ILA eligibility list.)
In May 1999, in concert with an INC visit to Washington, the Clinton
Administration announced a draw down of  $5 million worth of training and “non-
lethal” defense articles under the ILA.  During 1999-2000, about 150 opposition
members underwent civil administration training at Hurlburt air base in Florida,
including attending Defense Department-run courses in civil affairs skills needed for
a post-Saddam government.  The Clinton Administration asserted that the opposition
was not sufficiently organized to receive weaponry or combat training, a restriction
that reflected doubts about the viability of the opposition and concerns that the
United States might become militarily embroiled in civil conflict in Iraq.  The
Hurlburt trainees were not brought into Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or into the
Free Iraqi Forces that deployed to Iraq toward the end of the active combat phase of
the war.
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Bush Administration Policy 
Bush Administration policy toward Iraq started out similar to that of its
predecessor’s, but policy changed dramatically after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks.  Some recent accounts assert that the Administration was planning, well prior
to September 11, 2001, to confront Iraq militarily; others say that the shift toward a
more assertive policy was prompted largely by the September 11 attacks.  The policy
shift first became clear in President Bush’s State of the Union message on January
29, 2002; in that speech, he characterized Iraq as part of an “axis of evil,” along with
Iran and North Korea.
Pre-September 11: Reinforcing Containment.  Throughout most of its
first year, the Bush Administration continued the basic elements of its predecessor’s
policy on Iraq.  With no immediate consensus on whether or  how to pursue
Saddam’s overthrow, Secretary of State Powell focused on strengthening
containment of Iraq, which the Bush Administration said had eroded substantially in
the few preceding years.  Secretary Powell visited the Middle East in February 2001
to enlist regional support for a “smart sanctions” plan — modification of the U.N.
sanctions regime and “oil-for-food” program to improve international enforcement
of the U.N. ban on exports of  weapons-related technology to Iraq.  The plan offered
to relax U.N. restrictions on exports to Iraq of purely civilian equipment.18
The Administration believed that the “smart sanctions” proposal, by easing the
suffering of the Iraqi people, would cause Iraq’s neighbors and other countries to
cease unilateral violations of the sanctions regime.  Secretary Powell, who had openly
expressed skepticism about the opposition’s prospects, barely raised the regime
change issue during his trip or in his March 7, 2001, testimony before the House
International Relations Committee, at which he was questioned about Iraq.19  After
about a year of Security Council negotiations, the major feature of the smart
sanctions plan — new procedures that virtually eliminated U.N. review of civilian
exports to Iraq — was adopted on May 14, 2002 (U.N. Resolution 1409).  
Even though several senior officials had been strong advocates of a regime
change policy, many of the long-standing questions about the difficulty of that
strategy were debated early in the Bush Administration,20 and the regime change
component of Iraq policy was not emphasized.  During his confirmation hearings as
Deputy Secretary of Defense, a leading  advocate of overthrowing Iraq’s regime, Paul
Wolfowitz, said that he did not yet see a “plausible  plan” for changing the regime.
Like its predecessor, the Bush Administration  declined to provide the opposition
with lethal aid, combat training, or a  commitment of direct U.S. military help. 
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Post-September 11: Implementing Regime Change.  After September
11, the Bush  Administration stressed  regime change and asserted that  containment
was failing.  After the U.S.-led war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan
began in early October 2001, speculation began building that the Administration
might try to change Iraq’s regime through direct use of military force as part of a
“phase two” of the war on terrorism.  Some U.S. officials, particularly deputy
Defense Secretary Wolfowitz, asserted that the United States needed to respond to
the September 11, 2001 attacks by ending any or all regimes that support terrorist
groups, including Iraq.  Vice President Cheney visited the Middle East in March
2002 reportedly to consult regional countries about the possibility of confronting Iraq
militarily, although the countries visited reportedly urged greater U.S. attention to the
Arab-Israeli dispute and opposed confrontation with Iraq.  Recent accounts, including
the book “Plan of Attack,” by Bob Woodward (published in April 2004), say that
Secretary of State Powell and others were concerned about the potential
consequences of an invasion of Iraq, particularly the difficulties of building a
democratic and peaceful political structure after major hostilities ended. 
  
The two primary themes in the Bush Administration’s public case for
confronting Iraq were (1)  its purported refusal to end its WMD programs, and (2) its
ties to terrorist groups, to which Iraq might transfer WMD for conduct of a
catastrophic attack on the United States.  President Bush did not assert that Iraq was
an imminent or immediate threat to U.S. security, but he called Iraq a “grave and
gathering” threat that should be blunted before the threat became imminent.  The
Administration added that regime change would yield the further benefit of
liberating the Iraqi people and promoting stability and democracy in the Middle East.
Iraq and Al Qaeda.  Iraq  was a designated state sponsor of terrorism during
1979-82, and was again designated after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait.  Although they
did not assert that Saddam Hussein’s regime had a direct connection to the
September 11 attacks or the subsequent anthrax mailings, senior U.S. officials said
there was evidence of Iraqi linkages to Al Qaeda.  The final report by the bipartisan
commission on the September 11 attacks found no evidence of an operational linkage
between them.  Iraq was removed from the terrorism list by President Bush on
September 24, 2004 (Presidential Determination 2004-52).  See CRS Report
RL32217, Iraq and Al Qaeda: Allies or Not?  
WMD Threat Perception.  Senior U.S. officials asserted the following about
Iraq’s WMD:  (1) that Iraq had worked to rebuild its WMD programs in the nearly
four years since U.N. weapons inspectors left Iraq and had failed to comply with 17
U.N. resolutions, including Resolution 1441 (November 8, 2002) that demanded
complete elimination of all of Iraq’s WMD programs; (2) that Iraq had used chemical
weapons against its own people (the Kurds) and against Iraq’s neighbors (Iran),
implying that Iraq would not necessarily be deterred from using WMD against the
United States or its allies.  Critics noted that, under the U.S. threat of massive
retaliation, Iraq did not use WMD against U.S. troops in the 1991 Gulf war.  On the
other hand, Iraq defied U.S. warnings of retaliation and did burn Kuwait’s oil fields
in that war; and (3) that Iraq could transfer its WMD to terrorists, particularly Al
Qaeda, that could use these weapons to cause hundreds of thousands of deaths in the
United States or elsewhere. 
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Broadening the Iraqi Opposition as War Approaches.  As it began in
mid-2002 to prepare for possible military action against Iraq, the Bush
Administration tried to build up the Iraqi opposition.  On June 16, 2002, the
Washington Post reported that, in early 2002, President Bush authorized stepped up
covert activities by the CIA and special operations forces to destabilize Saddam
Hussein.  In August 2002, the State and Defense Departments jointly invited six
major opposition groups — the INC, the INA, the KDP, the PUK, SCIRI, and the
MCM — to Washington for meetings with senior officials, including a video link to
Vice President Cheney.  
At the same time, the Administration expanded  its ties to groups composed of
ex-military officers, as well as to some ethnic-based groups; some of these groups are
active in post-Saddam Iraq.  These groups included  the Iraqi National Movement;
the Iraqi National Front; the Iraqi Free Officers and Civilians Movement;  the Higher
Council for National Salvation, headed by a former head of Iraqi military
intelligence;21 the Iraqi Turkmen Front, a small, ethnic-based group, considered
aligned with Turkish policy;22 the Islamic Accord of Iraq, a Damascus-based Shiite
Islamic Party; and the Assyrian Democratic Movement, which is headed by Yonadam
Yousif  Kanna. Iraq’s Assyrians are based primarily in northern Iraq, but there is a
substantial diaspora community living in the United States; the group began
integrating into the broader opposition front in September 2002.  (In post-Saddam
Iraq, Kanna served on the IGC.)  On December 9, 2002, the Administration made six
of these factions (not the Higher Council for National Salvation) eligible to receive
ILA draw-downs, and he authorized the remaining $92 million worth of goods and
services available under the ILA for those  groups, as well as for the  INA, the INC,
the KDP, the PUK, SCIRI, and the MCM.  
The Bush Administration  applauded efforts during  2001-2002  by the ex-
military led groups to coordinate with each other and with other groups.  One such
meeting, in July 2002 in London and jointly run with the INC, attracted over 70 ex-
military officers.  As U.S. military action against Iraq approached, the Administration
also began a program to train about 5,000 oppositionists in tasks that could assist
U.S. forces, possibly including combat units.23  An initial group of 3,000 was
selected, but only about 70 of them completed training at an air base (Taszar) in
Hungary.24  These recruits served with U.S. forces in OIF as translators and mediators
between U.S. forces and local leaders. 
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As 2002 drew to a close, the opposition began planning its role in the war and
post-Saddam Iraq.  During December 14-17, 2002, with U.S. officials attending,
major Iraqi opposition groups met in London and sought to declare a provisional
government.  The Administration opposed that step on the grounds that doing so
would give the impression that the United States was backing the exile groups to
dominate post-war Iraq politically.  Major opposition  groups met again (in northern
Iraq) in late February 2003, forming  a committee to prepare for a transition regime.
Attending was Adnan Pachachi,  who served as foreign minister and ambassador to
the United Nations during the 1950s and 1960s, under the military governments of
Qasim and “the Arif brothers” (see above).  Pachachi, who is about 80, lived in  the
UAE during Saddam Hussein’s rule and heads a small party called the “Iraqi
Independent Democrats.”  He was one of the rotating presidents of the IGC  (January
2004), and was a U.S. favorite to be president of the interim government.  
Decision to Launch Military Action.  As U.N. inspectors worked in Iraq
under the new mandates provided in Resolution 1441, the Administration demanded
complete disarmament by Iraq to avert military action.  In an effort to garner
international support for a U.S.-led war, the Administration downplayed the goal of
regime change in President Bush’s September 12, 2002, speech before the United
Nations General Assembly, stressing instead the need to enforce U.N. resolutions on
Iraq.  The Administration emphasized the regime change goal after February 2003
as diplomacy at the United Nations ran its course.
In mid-March 2003, U.N. diplomacy over whether the U.N. Security Council
should authorize war broke down.  The impasse followed several briefings for the
U.N. Security Council by the director of the U.N. inspection body  UNMOVIC
(U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission)  Hans Blix and the
director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohammad al-Baradei,
most recently on March 7, 2003.  The briefings, based on WMD inspections that
resumed November 27, 2002, under Resolution 1441, criticized Iraq for failing to
pro-actively cooperate to clear up outstanding questions about its  WMD program,
but the latter two briefings (February 24 and March 7, 2003) noted progress in
clearing up some uncertainties and said that it was not certain that Iraq retained any
WMD.  The inspectors reported few, if any, Iraqi obstructions in about 700
inspections of about 400 different sites.  Iraq declared short range ballistic missiles
that were determined by Blix to be of prohibited ranges, and Blix ordered Iraq to
destroy them;  Iraq began the destruction prior to the war.  The briefings appeared to
match what was found in the course of the post-war U.S.-led WMD searches by the
Iraq Survey Group (ISG), as outlined in the “Duelfer report” released on September
22, 2004.
Security Council opponents of war, including France, Russia, China, and
Germany, said the pre-war WMD inspections showed that Iraq could be disarmed
peacefully or contained indefinitely.  On the Security Council, the United States,
along with Britain, Spain, and Bulgaria, maintained that Iraq had not fundamentally
decided to disarm.  At a March 16, 2003, summit meeting with the leaders of  Britain,
Spain, and Bulgaria at the Azores, President Bush asserted  that diplomatic options
to disarm Iraq peacefully had failed.  The following evening, President Bush gave
Saddam Hussein and his sons, Uday and Qusay, an ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48
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hours to avoid war.  They refused the ultimatum, and OIF was launched on March
19, 2003.  
In the war, Iraq’s conventional military forces were overwhelmed by U.S. and
British forces, although some Iraqi units and irregulars (“Saddam’s Fedayeen”) put
up stiff resistance and used unconventional tactics.  No major Iraqi military
commanders or Baathist political figures came forward to try to establish a post-
Saddam government; and regime leaders fled Baghdad.  No WMD was used,
although Iraq did fire some ballistic missiles into Kuwait; it  is not clear whether
those missiles were of prohibited ranges (greater than 150 km).  As noted above, the
regime vacated Baghdad on April 9, 2003, although Saddam appeared publicly with
supporters that day in a district of Baghdad where he was popular.  
As noted above, organs of the U.S. government are attempting to uncover
evidence of gross human rights abuses and other violations of the regime of Saddam
Hussein, in addition to evidence of WMD.  See CRS Report RL32379, Iraq: Former
Regime Weapons Programs, Human Rights Violations, and U.S. Policy.  
Post-Saddam Governance and Transition25
There has been substantial debate about the course of U.S. policy toward Iraq
as post-Saddam insurgency and violence have persisted.  The outcome of the debate
will likely depend on the duration and intensity of continued resistance;  the numbers
of U.S. casualties; the amount of WMD found, if any; the pace of reconstruction; and
the stability and orientation of Iraq’s government.  During 2004, President Bush has
said in his speeches that there is positive movement on major issues and that the
United States should “stay the course” by implementing the political transition
roadmap discussed below.  Some observers say that insurgency and violence in Iraq,
which senior U.S. officials said in September 2004 was escalating despite U.S.
counter-steps, suggests major difficulty for U.S. policy and that new steps should be
considered.  Some options are discussed in this section. 
Occupation Period and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).
After the fall of the regime, the United States set up an occupation structure, a
decision reportedly based on Administration concerns that immediate sovereignty
would likely result in infighting among and domination by  major factions.  The
Bush Administration initially tasked Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (ret.) to direct
reconstruction, with a staff of U.S. diplomats and other U.S. government personnel
who served as advisers and administrators in Iraq’s various ministries.  He headed
the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), within the
Department of Defense, created by a January 20, 2003 executive order.  Garner and
about 200 of his staff deployed to Iraq in April 2003. 
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Garner’s focus was to try to quickly establish a representative successor Iraqi
regime.  Garner organized a meeting in Nasiriyah (April 15, 2003) of about 100
Iraqis of varying ideologies; many of the attendees were representatives of Iraqi tribal
groupings and emerging political movements.  A follow-up meeting of about 250
delegates was held  in Baghdad on April 26, 2003, ending in agreement to hold a
broader meeting, within a month, to name an interim Iraqi administration.  In parallel,
the the major exile parties began a series of meetings, with U.S. envoys present.  
Press reports said that senior U.S. officials were dissatisfied with Garner’s
perceived lax approach to post-Saddam security and that they  feared that Garner’s
political transition process would lead to domination by the major exile parties.  In
early May 2003, senior U.S. officials ended this process of selecting a transition
regime and, on May 6, 2003, the Administration named former ambassador L. Paul
Bremer to replace Garner as head of the overall Iraq effort.  He arrived in Iraq on
May 12, 2003, to head the “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA), which subsumed
ORHA.  U.S. officials refer to the CPA as an occupying authority recognized by U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003). 
The major exile parties criticized the U.S. decision to cut Garner’s political
process short.  Partly in response to the criticism, Bremer said on June 23, 2003 that
he would appoint a  25- to 30-member Iraqi body that would have “real authority”
(though not formal sovereignty).  Bremer said the “Governing Council” would
nominate ministry heads, recommend policies, and draft a new constitution.26  
Another alteration of the U.S. post-war structure was made public in early
October 2003; the White House announced that an “Iraq Stabilization Group” under
the direction of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice would coordinate
interagency support to the CPA in Iraq.  A Rice deputy, Robert Blackwill, is the
NSC’s primary official for the Iraq transition.  The U.S. Administration’s post-war
policy largely discarded U.S. State Department plans, which had supported a group
of Iraqi exiles to address issues that would confront a successor government.27  The
State Department initiative, called the “Future of Iraq Project,” does not appear to
have significant influence on any post-war regime decision-making in Iraq, although
some Iraqis who participated are now in various Iraqi official bodies.  Some experts
believe the Defense Department was promoting a competing or separate group of
exiles.28  The State Department project, which cost $5 million, consisted of about 15
working groups on each major issue.
The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC).  On July 13, 2003, the “Iraq Governing
Council (IGC)” was unveiled, appointed by the CPA.  It was dominated by major
exile parties but contained other prominent Iraqis as well. It had three women and
CRS-21
29 Constable, Pamela. “ Iraqi Communists Make a Comeback.”  Washington Post, Jan. 29,
2004. 
included Shiites, Sunni Arabs, Kurds, and others.  (It voted to dissolve on June 1,
2004, in concert with the naming of the interim government.)  
There were 13 Shiites on the IGC, of which six were Islamists.  One seat was
held by SCIRI directly (Abd al-Aziz Al Hakim); one was held by marsh guerrilla
leader Abdul Karim al-Muhammadawi); two were Da’wa Party leaders (Ibrahim al-
Jafari and Abdul Zahra Mohammad, also known as Izzaddin Salim) and one was a
former Da’wa  member (Muwaffaq al-Ruba’i).  The sixth was independent, moderate
cleric, Mohammad Bahr al-Ulum, who headed the Ahl al-Bayt charity center in
London since the 1980s.  The remaining seven Shiites, including Chalabi and Allawi,
were secular; including the head of the Iraqi Communist Party (Hamid al-Musa),
which  is making a comeback in Iraq.  It had been allied with Saddam Hussein’s
Baath Party in the 1950s and 1960s but was purged and repressed by the Baathists
after the  party took power for the second time in 1968.  It has resumed open
activities in post-Saddam Iraq.29  Two were women.
The IGC had five Sunni Muslim Arabs.  They were National Democratic Party
leader Nasir al-Chadirchy; Adnan Pachachi; Samir Shakir al-Sumaidy, a civil
engineer; Ghazi al-Yawar, a senior member of the Shammar tribe and president of
Saudi-based Hicap Technology; and Muhsin Abdul Hamid, head of the Iraqi Islamic
Party.  The body also had five Kurds (all Sunni Muslims):  the two Kurdish leaders
Talabani and Barzani and three independents, one of which was an Islamist.  The
other minority members were Yonadam Kanna, who was discussed above, and
Songul Chapuk, a Turkoman women’s activist. 
In July 2003, the Council decided that  nine members would rotate as presidents,
each for one month.  Those who were initially to rotate were Ibrahim Jafari, Chalabi,
Allawi, Talabani, Hakim, Pachachi, Barzani, Bahr al-Ulum, and Abdul Hamid.  The
IGC also decided that none would serve twice as president; the IGC selected  Shiite
member Izzaddin Salim to head the IGC during May 2004.  He was killed by a car
bomb outside CPA headquarters on May 17, 2004; his colleagues selected Ghazi al-
Yawar to fill the remaining few weeks.  
The IGC was less active than expected; some believe it was too heavily
dominated by exiles and lacked legitimacy among Iraqis.  In September 2003, the
IGC selected a 25-member “cabinet,” with roughly the same factional and ethnic
balance of the IGC itself.  Among major actions, the IGC began a process of “de-
Baathification,” later slowed, and authorized the establishment of a war crimes
tribunal for Saddam and his associates.  In December 2003, the IGC called for
expelling from Iraqi territory any members of an exiled Iranian opposition group
People’s Mojahedin, a signal of goodwill toward neighboring Iran.  However, in July
2004, U.S. forces declared the Mojahedin to be “protected persons”; they will not be
handed back to Iran or expelled from Camp Ashraf where U.S. soldiers are guarding
them. 
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June 28, 2004, Handover of Sovereignty  
The Bush Administration initially made the end of  the U.S. occupation
contingent on the completion of a new constitution and the holding of national
elections for a new government, tasks which were expected to be completed by late
2005.  However, the IGC made little progress in drafting a constitution due to
factional divisions.  Ayatollah Sistani insisted that drafters be elected.  In the fall of
2003, the major factions began agitating for an early restoration of  Iraqi sovereignty.
CPA head Bremer consulted with President Bush, resulting in a decision to accelerate
the transfer of  sovereignty.  On November 15, 2003, the CPA and the IGC
announced agreement a plan to draft, by February 28, 2004, a provisional
constitution, or  Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), and for sovereignty to
return to Iraq by June 30, 2004.  Under the agreement, 15-person committees were
to be selected in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces; they would select participants for
broader  “caucuses.”  By May 31, 2004, the caucuses were to select members of a
250-member national assembly, which would choose an executive branch, including
a provisional leader, and then assume sovereignty.  National elections for a
permanent government would be held by December 31, 2005. 
This plan attracted mixed reviews.  Ayatollah Sistani strongly opposed  the
“caucuses” as not democratic.  In part to address his concerns, the CPA abandoned
that idea and asked the United Nations to assess the feasibility of holding elections
prior to a restoration of sovereignty.  A U.N. team led by senior U.N. adviser Lakhdar
Brahimi conducted its assessment during February 7-16, 2004, and, based on the
team’s report, U.N. Secretary General Annan said in February 2004 that elections for
a new government could not be completed by June 30, 2004, but might be feasible
by the end of 2004 or by early 2005.  
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)/Transition Roadmap.  Much
of the Brahimi findings were incorporated into the Transitional Administrative Law
(TAL), which lays out a transition roadmap.  Although it was delayed by factional
infighting, the IGC formally signed the TAL on March 8, 2004.30  Before and
immediately after the signing, Sistani expressed opposition to the TAL’s limitations
on the authority of a transition (post-January 2005) president and  its provision
allowing the Kurds a veto over a permanent constitution; he called on the United
Nations not to formally endorse the TAL.  The key points of the TAL are as follows:
! A “transition government” is to be formed, chosen by a 275-seat
National Assembly elected in voting no later than January 31, 2005.
The Assembly is to choose a “presidency council” consisting of a
president and two deputy presidents.  It is expected that the president
would be a Shiite, and the two deputies a Sunni Arab and a Kurd.
The presidency council is to operate by consensus, and it is to name
a prime minister by unanimous vote. 
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! The election law for the transition government “shall aim to achieve
the goal of having women constitute no less than 25% of the
members of the National Assembly.”
! The Kurds maintain their autonomous “Kurdistan Regional
Government,” but they were not given control of the city of Kirkuk
and they received some powers to contradict or alter the application
of Iraqi law in the Kurdish provinces.  The Kurdish militias
(“peshmerga”) were allowed to continue to operate. 
! The transition government (post-January 31, 2005) is to draft (by
August 15, 2005) a constitution to be put to a national vote by
October 15, 2005.  A provision, which Sistani and the Shiite
Islamists are said to want to overturn, allows two-thirds of the voters
any three Iraqi provinces to veto the permanent constitution, giving
the Kurds (who control the three northern provinces of Dohuk, Irbil,
and Sulaymaniyah) a veto.  If the constitution is not approved,
another draft is to be completed and voted on by October 15, 2006.
! If the permanent constitution is approved, elections to a permanent
government are to occur by December 15, 2005, and it is to take
office by December 31, 2005.  If the constitution is not approved,
then elections for a new national assembly are to be held by
December 15, 2005.  
! The TAL states that Islam is the official religion of  Iraq and is to be
considered “a source,” but not the only source or the primary source,
of legislation.  It adds that no law can be passed that contradicts the
agreed tenets of Islam, but neither can any law contradict certain
rights including peaceful assembly; free expression; equality of men
and women before the law; and the right to strike and demonstrate.
Interim (Post-June 28) Government/Sovereignty Handover.  The TAL
did not address how an interim (post-handover) government would be chosen.
Options for selecting the interim government included holding a traditional assembly
along the lines of Afghanistan’s loya jirga; holding a smaller “roundtable” of Iraqi
notables; or transforming the existing or an expanded IGC into the interim
government.  To increase the legitimacy of the decision-making process, the United
States gave U.N. envoy Brahimi substantial responsibility for selecting the interim
government that took power on June 28, 2004.31  He initially envisioned a
government of technocrats, devoid of figures who might use their official positions
to promote themselves in national elections.  However, maneuvering by IGC and
cabinet members led to inclusion of many of them — or their political allies — in the
interim government selected on June 1, 2004.  A few of  the cabinet positions are
held by relatively non-political personalities.  By June 25, in advance of the
handover, the CPA had finished turning over all ministries to Iraqi control. The
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interim government began work immediately, but the formal handover of sovereignty
took place in a brief ceremony at about 10:30 A.M. Baghdad time on June 28, 2004.
The handover occurred two days before the advertised June 30 date, partly to
confound insurgents. 
 
The powers of the interim government are  addressed in an addendum to the
TAL, signed by the IGC on June 1, 2004.  The interim government has a
“presidency” composed of  a largely ceremonial president (former IGC member and
Shammar tribal elder Ghazi al-Yawar) and  two deputy presidents (Ibrahim al-Jafari
of the Da’wa Party and KDP activist Dr. Rowsch Shaways).  There is a prime
minister (INA leader Iyad al-Allawi), a deputy prime minister, 26 ministers, two
ministers of state with portfolio, and three ministers of state without portfolio.  The
prime minister has executive power.  Six ministers are women, and the ethnicities of
the interim government are roughly the same as they were in the IGC.  The major
positions include the following:
! Deputy Prime Minister (for national security).  PUK official Barham
Salih, formerly PUK representative in Washington and prime
minister of the PUK-controlled region of northern Iraq. 
! Minister of Defense.  Hazem al-Shaalan, an elder of the Ghazal tribe
who was in exile during 1985-2003.
! Interior Minister.  Falah al-Naqib, son of ex-Baathist general Hassan
al-Naqib.  (Hassan al-Naqib was a member of the first executive
committee of the INC in the early 1990s.)  
! Minister of Finance.  Senior SCIRI official Adel Abdul Mahdi.
! Minister of Oil.  Former oil ministry official Thamir Ghadban, who
played a major role in rehabilitating Iraq’s oil industry since the fall
of Saddam’s regime. 
! Some IGC cabinet “ministers” were retained.  KDP official Hoshyar
Zebari, was “foreign minister” in the IGC cabinet and was retained
in this position.  Dr. Mehdi al-Hafidh, an independent Shiite,
remained as Minister of Planning; PUK official Dr. Abdul Latif
Rashid stayed as Minister of Water Resources; and Ms. Nasreen
Berwari stayed as Minister of Public Works.  An IGC member,
Shiite Muslim Wael Abd al-Latif, became Minister of State for
Provinces.  The Iraqi Ambassador to the United States is Rend
Rahim, formerly an opposition activist based in the United States.
However, there have been reports she might be replaced.  
Resolution 1546.  Many of the powers and responsibilities of the interim
government are spelled out in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546, adopted
unanimously on June 8, 2004.  It  endorsed the handover of sovereignty and provided
for the following:
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! U.S. officials  no longer have final  authority on non-security related
issues.  Resolution 1546 says that the interim government is not to
make any long-term laws or decisions:  its primary function is to run
the ministries and prepare for the January 2005 assembly elections.
Many international law experts say that the interim government
could conceivably exceed this intended mandate, possibly including
amending the TAL or revoking CPA decrees, but it has not taken
such steps to date.  The Kurds feared that the interim government
would repeal TAL provisions that the Kurds view as protecting them
from the Arab majority;32 their fears were heightened by the
omission from  Resolution 1546 of any mention of the TAL.  
! One of the major debates in the adoption of Resolution 1546 was on
the relationship between coalition forces and the Iraqi interim
government.  The relationship — coordination and partnership — is
spelled out in an exchange of letters between Secretary of State
Powell and Prime Minister Allawi, annexed to the resolution.  Iraqi
participation in specific operations is at the discretion of the Iraqi
government, but the Iraqi government does not have a veto over
specific coalition operations, and the coalition retains the ability to
take prisoners.  The Resolution implements the provision of  the
TAL that, at least until the end of 2005 (the end of the transition
period), Iraqi forces will be “a principal partner in the multi-national
force operating in Iraq under unified [American] command pursuant
to the provisions of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 (October
16, 2003) and any subsequent resolutions.”  
! Resolution 1546 says that the coalition’s mandate would be
reviewed “at the request of the Government of Iraq or twelve months
from the date of this resolution,” that the mandate would expire
when a permanent government is sworn in at the end of 2005, and
that the mandate would be terminated “if the Iraqi government so
requests.”  The Resolution, as does the TAL, defers to the post-
January 31, 2005, government the issue of an agreement on the
status of coalition forces in Iraq.  
! The resolution gave the interim government control over Iraq’s oil
revenues and the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), subject to
monitoring for at least one year by the U.N.-mandated International
Advisory and Monitoring Board.  The interim government also was
given responsibility for close-out of the “oil-for-food program.”33
! Resolution 1546 gave the United Nations a major role in assisting
and advising the Iraqi government in preparing for national elections
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and in many aspects of governance.  It  also authorized a force
within the coalition to protect U.N. personnel and facilities.
Post-Handover Authority Building/Interim Parliament.  The process of
building an Iraqi government continued after the handover.34  Resolution 1546 and
the addendum to the TAL provided for the holding of a conference of over 1,000
Iraqis (chosen from all around Iraq by a 60-member commission of Iraqis) to choose
a 100-seat advisory council (“Interim National Council”) — essentially an interim
parliament.  This body does not have legislative authority, but according to the
addendum to the TAL, it is able to veto decisions by the executive branch with a 2/3
majority.  The conference, due to be held by July 31, 2004, but postponed due to
security concerns and political infighting,  was held under tight security during
August 13-18, 2004.  The conference was dominated by a crisis of violence in Najaf,
but it completed the selection of an 81-member slate of candidates, dominated by the
major Shiite, Kurdish, and other exile parties.35  The other 19 seats are held by the
IGC members who did not obtain positions in the interim government, as provided
for in the TAL.  Some smaller parties said the meeting was chaotic and did not
provide them with a “level-playing field;” they apparently accepted the result
nonetheless.  The council was sworn in on September 1, 2004. 
The following other actions were undertaken in connection with the handover.
! CPA head Bremer  departed Iraq for the United States on June 28,
2004, and the CPA and formal state of occupation ceased.
Ambassador John Negroponte, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq,
confirmed by the Senate on May 6, 2004, arrived in Iraq and
subsequently presented credentials to the Iraqi interim government.
This established formal U.S.-Iraq diplomatic relations for the first
time since January 1991, the eve of the 1991 Persian Gulf war.  A
large U.S. embassy opened on June 30, 2004; it is being staffed with
about 1,000 U.S. personnel,  including about 160 U.S. officials and
representatives that will serve as advisers to the interim government.
(See, CRS Report RS21867, U.S. Embassy in Iraq.) 
! Some CPA functions, such as the advising of local Iraqi
governments, local Iraqi governing councils, and U.S. military units,
have been retained at the U.S. embassy in the form of an  “Iraq
Reconstruction and Management Office (IRMO).”  About 150 U.S.
personnel are serving in at least four major centers around Iraq to
advise local Iraqi governments:  Hilla, Basra, Kirkuk, and Mosul.
As of November 2004, the IRMO is to be headed by Ambassador
William Taylor, formerly U.S. aid coordinator for Afghanistan.  
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! In connection with the handover, U.S. military headquarters in
Baghdad (Combined Joint Task Force-7, CJTF-7) has become a
multi-national headquarters (Multinational Force-Iraq, MNF-I).
Four-star U.S. Gen. George Casey, confirmed by the Senate on June
24, 2004, is commander.36  Before dissolving on June 28, the CPA
extended existing orders giving U.S. military people, and some
contractors, immunity from prosecution by Iraqi courts.37  
! The Program Management Office (PMO), which reported to the
Department of Defense and administers some U.S. funds for Iraq,
has been replaced by a “Project and Contracting Office (PCO).”
Preparations for January 2005 Elections.  U.S. and Iraqi attention has
turned to the January 2005 Assembly elections and simultaneous elections for
provincial governments and the Kurdish regional assembly.  U.S. and Iraqi officials
say they “intend” to proceed with elections on schedule, despite escalating insurgent
violence, although some observers and some Iraqi officials, including interim
president Ghazi al-Yawar, say the violence could necessitate a postponement.  Many
observers believe the elections will not be seen as legitimate if certain provinces
cannot vote due to security conditions.  
The United Nations has formed an 8-member “election commission,” nominated
by notables from around Iraq, that is to run the elections.  The United Nations, as
well as CPA orders (Order numbers 92,96, and 97) issued just before the handover,
recommend that the voting be conducted by proportional representation (closed list),
in which voters choose among competing parties.  Seats in the Assembly would be
allocated in proportion to that party list’s showing in the voting.  Whether the
recommendations are implemented is to be determined by the election commission.
To be certified to compete, each party will need 500 signatures from eligible voters.
Voter registration is to begin on November 1, 2004, based initially on former regime
ration card lists containing about 14 million names.  Candidate certification is to take
place by mid-December 2004.  
Security and logistics are major concerns.  The 35-person U.N. contingent now
in Iraq includes new U.N. envoy Ashraf Jahangir Qazi, a Pakistani U.N. diplomat,
but only 5 election specialists.  Iraqi officials are complaining that this contingent
is far too small to prepare for the elections, which will involve as many as 30,000
polling places around Iraq.  By contrast, there were 300 U.N. personnel overseeing
elections in East Timor in 1999, which is far smaller in area and population than is
Iraq.  U.S. officials are attempting to find donors to a U.N. protection force provided
for by Resolution 1546.  Thus far, Fiji has pledged 130 troops and Georgia is said to
be nearing agreement to donate forces as well.  As discussed below, U.S. and Iraqi
forces have stepped up counter-insurgency operations in several Sunni cities to try
to pave the way for substantial Sunni participation in the elections.  The chief U.N.
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election official in Iraq, Carlos Valenzuela, said on October 21, 2004, that the
election process is moving forward well, with 550 voter registration sites already
established and 6,000 hired to staff them.  Some estimate as many as 150,000 staff
will eventually be needed in the election.  
Press reports say there is little evident public enthusiasm for the elections,
particularly among Sunni Arabs whose representatives are threatening a major
boycott.  However, substantial political activity is said to be taking place behind the
scenes in the form of negotiations among political parties.38  According to observers,
major Shiite and Kurdish factions are negotiating with Prime Minister Allawi and his
associates on a joint party list for the elections.  Some observers say that Ayatollah
Sistani is seeking to place as many Shiite Islamists (SCIRI and Da’wa) figures on the
joint party list as possible and that Allawi is seeking to place his close associates on
the joint list.  Smaller parties are believed to be attempting to form coalitions that
would compete with this list.  Some reports say that Sadr might join the mainstream
Shiite parties in the joint list, although others say he and Chalabi might try to form
a competing list.  
The State Department says it needs to spend about $40 million for “party
building” activities, assistance mainly to small, emerging parties that might not
otherwise be able to compete.  U.S. officials say their goals are to promote coalitions
of smaller parties so that the coalitions can be strong enough to win seats in the
assembly elections.  To  run the elections, the Iraqi government has budgeted about
$230 million, of which $100 million is expected to be offset by international donors.
Under an approved September 2004 request to Congress to reallocate funds from the
FY2004 supplemental appropriation, the Administration will spend $40 million for
election assistance.
U.S. election-related assistance will attempt to complement U.S. efforts already
underway to promote local governance and politics.  Although governance at the
national level has been contentious, there appears to have been political progress at
the local level.  U.S. officials say Iraqis are freer than at any time in the past 30 years,
with a free press and the ability to organize politically; dozens of political parties
have formed since the fall of Saddam’s regime.  Over 500 courts are operating, as are
about 700 local governing councils.  Elections for local leaders, to replace those
appointed by U.S.-led forces immediately after  the fall of the regime, have been held
throughout Iraq.  Some Iraqi women are becoming more politically active, and
among other grassroots activities, more than 700 tribal leaders formed a “farmers’
union” in January 2004.  A U.S. funded “Community Action Program (CAP)” is
providing local leaders with grant money for specific community projects.39  USAID
is conducting more than 1,400 democracy dialogue activities to help Iraqis prepare
for the transition to participatory government.  
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In January 2004, the Administration reallocated funds appropriated in the
FY2004 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 108-106) for local governance and civil
society promotion; adding $368 million for these activities.  Under the September
2004 reallocation of funds (mentioned above), the Administration will spend an
additional $180 million on “democracy and governance,” including $100 million to
strengthen local governments.  Some of these funds, as well as an additional $10
million appropriated to the U.S. Institute of Peace, are going to U.S. democratization
organizations, such as National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International
Republican Institute (IRI) to do training and capacity building at the local level, as
well as work with emerging and established national political organizations.40
Emerging Iraqi leaders are being trained by various U.S. government agencies and
other institutions. 
Security Challenges to the Transition 
The resistance to U.S. forces and their Iraqi allies has defied most expectations
in  intensity and duration, although there is little agreement on the reasons for the
level of resistance.  As of October 22 2004, about 1,108 U.S. forces and about 150
coalition partner soldiers have died in Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Of  U.S. deaths,
about 1,050 have occurred since President Bush declared an end to “major combat
operations” in Iraq on May 1, 2003.  About 140,000 U.S. troops are in Iraq, with
about another 50,000 troops in Kuwait supporting OIF or rotating into Iraq. 
The Insurgency.  Upon assuming his position, CENTCOM commander John
Abizaid said (July 17, 2003) that the United States faces a “classic guerrilla war.”
Subsequent  to the capture of Saddam Hussein in mid-December 2003, some U.S.
commanders had said the United States had “turned the corner” against the ex-
Baathist component of the resistance, with the help of documents captured from
Saddam U.S. forces; less so against “foreign fighters” who have come into Iraq.
Backing away from earlier comments, senior U.S. officials now say that the
insurgency is broader and more tenacious than predicted, and Secretary of State
Powell and Secretary of State Rumsfeld both said in September 2004 that the
insurgency is “worsening.”  Some estimates says insurgents may number 20,000 or
more, with a higher degree of coordination than previously believed, and are well
funded from wealthy donors in neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia.41  Other
reports say the insurgents are increasingly pressuring U.S. supply lines, necessitating
air drops of supplies in some cases.  Some believe the elections could quiet the
insurgency by bestowing legitimacy on an Iraqi government. 
The bulk of the resistance appears to be motivated by opposition to perceived
U.S. rule, although the Sunni insurgency appears increasingly dominated by younger
Iraqi insurgents, in partnership with foreign Islamic fighters, who might want to
establish an Islamic state.  Sunni insurgents might also be working to ensure that
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Iraq’s Shiite majority does not take over the instruments of government through
elections or peaceful means; the Sunnis have historically ruled  Iraq.  The resistance
has sought  to demonstrate that U.S. stabilization efforts are not working by causing
international workers and peacekeeping forces to leave Iraq, slowing reconstruction,
turning the Iraqi populace against the coalition, and provoking civil conflict among
Iraq’s  ethnic groups.  Insurgent targets have included not only U.S. forces but also
Iraqis working for U.S. authorities, foreign contractors, oil export facilities, water and
other infrastructure facilities, and symbols of the international presence, including
U.N. headquarters.  Despite some tensions among Iraq’s various factions, U.S.
officials believe it is unlikely the violence will turn into all-out civil conflict among
Iraqis, although some outside expert organizations see this as a distinct possibility.42
A  “terrorism” dimension to the insurgency began in August 2003 with vehicle
bombings in Baghdad of the embassy of Jordan (August 7) and U.N. headquarters at
the Canal Hotel (August 19).  Among the dead in the latter bombing was the U.N.
representative in Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and it prompted an evacuation of U.N.
personnel from Iraq.  An August 29, 2003, car bombing in Najaf  killed SCIRI leader
Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim and 100 others.  Suicide bombings and like attacks occur
almost daily, targeting  coalition bases throughout Iraq, political party headquarters,
religious festivities, Iraqi police and military training and recruitment facilities, U.N.
and foreign embassy compounds, and hotels.  Some believe not all of these attacks
fit classic definitions of terrorism, because the targets of some of these attacks are
military-related. 
Starting in early April 2004, Iraqi resistance groups demanding the departure of
U.S. and other coalition forces have kidnapped individuals, including journalists and
civilian contract workers, mainly, although not exclusively, from countries
cooperating with the United States.  Some have been released but many have been
beheaded, including three Americans.  On October 20, 2004, an insurgent faction
kidnaped the British-born director of the CARE organization, Margaret Hassan,
prompting a pullout by that organization.  Many of the kidnappings and beheadings
have been attributed to foreign fighters linked to the Zarqawi faction.  See above, and
see also CRS Report RL32217, Iraq and Al Qaeda: Allies or Not?
2004 Uprisings.  Since the beginning of 2004, Sunni resistance activity has
escalated, and Shiite uprisings led by the Sadr faction have flared periodically.  Sunni
resistance escalated in April 2004, when insurgents in Fallujah killed and mutilated
the bodies of four U.S. security contractors on March 31, 2004, prompting a U.S.
move to seal off and retake the city.  Fearing collateral damage that could harm the
overall U.S. position in Iraq, in late April 2004  local U.S. commanders agreed to an
compromise in which a “Fallujah Brigade” led by former Iraqi general Muhammad
Latif, began patrolling the city.  The Fallujah Brigade did little to arrest insurgents
in the city, and U.S. commanders believe the city has become a haven for  insurgents;
the brigade was disbanded by U.S. forces in September 2004.  Sunni insurgent
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factions in Fallujah, Baqubah, Mosul, Ramadi, Samarra, Latifiyah, Mahmudiyah, and
Tal Affar have been reported to be operating with virtual impunity, with some degree
of popular support.  Fallujah reportedly is run by a “mujahedin shura,” or council of
insurgents.  U.S. forces, joined by Iraqi forces, began operations in September 2004
to restore Iraqi government control to these cities, beginning with Samarra.  U.S.
operations are now centering on attempting to retake Fallujah.  
The United States and the Iraqi government are also working to bring under
control areas in which Moqtada al-Sadr is popular.  In April 2004, Sadr’s Mahdi
Army armed itself and seized governing installations in at least seven Shiite-
populated cities as well as Baghdad’s Sadr City area.  In May 2004, U.S. and British
pressure contributed to an agreement under which Mahdi and U.S. forces would
cease fighting, and  Sadr himself  remained free.  Violence abated in June 2004 but
flared again in Najaf in early August 2004 after clashes around Sadr’s home and
office.  The violence in Najaf was resolved in a compromise brokered by Ayatollah
Sistani upon his return to Iraq in late August 2004.  Some reconstruction has begun
in outlying areas of  Najaf, but the old city around the Imam Ali Mosque remains
desolate and virtually destroyed.  Although Najaf has since been quiet, Sadr
supporters continue to exercise major influence in several southern cities, including
Nassiriyah, Diwaniyah, Amara, and Basra, as well as Sadr City.  On the other hand,
tensions in Sadr City have eased substantially under an agreement of mid-October
2004 in which Mahdi fighters are trading in heavy and medium weapons for cash and
pledges of several hundred million dollars in reconstruction funds, as well as release
of arrested Mahdi fighters.  The weapons trade-in program has been extended into
late October, with about 700 rocket-propelled grenades turned in, although some
believe the Mahdi fighters are trading in older model weapons and might buy newer
equipment with the cash they receive.  Many question Sadr’s occasional statements
that he is now willing to join the legitimate political process in Iraq.  
Prime Minister Allawi has announced measures and received new authorities
(emergency law powers, including curfews and added arrest powers) to combat the
insurgency, and he has tried to diplomatically engage insurgent factions, including
that of Sadr, to join the political process.  A law offering amnesty to insurgents,
except for those involved in killing coalition or Iraqi security forces, was issued in
early August 2004.  The death penalty, suspended after the fall of Saddam, was
reinstated in early August 2004.  Iraqi officials have also asserted that the insurgents
are receiving assistance from neighboring Syria and Iran, and Allawi has held
discussions with representatives of both countries to try to persuade them to  prevent
the movement of fighters, arms, and funds to the resistance in Iraq.  
Abu Ghraib Prisoner Abuses.  U.S. efforts to calm ongoing violence were
complicated somewhat by revelations in early May 2004 that U.S. military personnel
had abused prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad.  Photos of abuses in
progress were printed in newspapers worldwide, including in Iraq, and shown on
television.  At least seven U.S. soldiers have thus far been charged with abuses at the
prison.  Several congressional hearings have been held on the issue.  (For information
on the Abu Ghraib issue, see CRS “Current Legislative Issues” web page entitled
“Prisoners in Iraq; U.S. Treatment”  [http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/
isjus10.html].
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Options for Stabilizing Iraq
As instability in major parts of Iraq has continued, a number of options have
been implemented or are being discussed.  The Bush Administration maintains that
holding to the existing political and security transition plans, while working with
foreign allies and pro-U.S. Iraqis, will lead to stability and democracy.  On the other
hand, a National Intelligence Estimate completed in July 2004 reportedly concluded
that Iraq’s future is relatively bleak, with possibilities ranging from civil war to, at
best, tenuous stability.43  Some critics say that major new options need to be
considered.  Some argue for a large increase in U.S. forces in Iraq, others argue for
significant  concessions to persuade U.S. allies to play a greater role in Iraq, and a
few call for the United States to pullout of Iraq immediately.
“Iraqification”/Building Iraqi Forces.  A major goal of current policy is
the building of national Iraqi security institutions that the Bush Administration says
should eventually be able to secure Iraq by themselves.  To date, the performance of
Iraq’s forces have come into serious question as they have often failed or refused, on
their own, to forcefully combat the insurgency, although some units have engaged
insurgent forces when fighting alongside U.S. units.  Other questions have been
raised about their level of training, and some reports say they are penetrated by
insurgents.  U.S. officials say these forces are clearly not ready to secure Iraq.
Maj. Gen. David Petraeus, who had served until late 2003 as commander of the
101st Airborne Division, is overseeing the training of Iraqi security forces.  U.S.
Embassy Baghdad status reports say that a total of about 105,000 in the various
forces are considered trained or on hand.  In the September 2004 State Department
notification of a planned reallocation of FY2004 supplemental funds, an increase of
$1.8 billion is slated for accelerated building of the security forces — this is more
than half of the total reallocation request of $3.46 billion.  The following, based on
Administration status reports from late October 2004,  are the status of the major
Iraqi security institutions:  
! Iraqi Army and other military forces.  The CPA formally disbanded
the former Iraqi army following Bremer’s arrival in Baghdad; the
outcome of that move is still being debated.  The United States plans
to recruit, train, and equip a 27,000-person Iraqi Army, about 8% the
size of the pre-war Iraqi force, by April 2005.  About 4,500 are
trained or on hand  thus far.  Recruits are paid $60 per month and
receive nine weeks of training.  Within the Iraqi Army is a Special
Operations Force, trained largely by Jordan.  About 615 are trained
or on hand at this time, and the goal is 2,000.  Iraq’s Air Force
currently has about 160 personnel of a planned 500, with very little
major air equipment.  A separate Coastal Defense Force has  about
410 personnel trained or on hand, of a goal of almost 600.  The force
is equipped with donated small boats to patrol Iraq’s waterways to
prevent smuggling and infiltration.  About $2 billion to train and
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equip the Iraqi military was provided by the FY2004 supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 108-106).  The September 2004 reallocation
plans to add $112 million for the military, including $28 million for
Iraqi Air Force airfields.
! The paramilitary Iraqi National Guard (formerly called the Civil
Defense Corps, or ICDC) is a part of the military that assists in
combating insurgents.  Thus far, about 41,000 are on hand, nearly all
trained, of a planned force of about 62,000 by April 2005.  Recruits
are paid $50 per month and cannot have served in Iraq’s former
army at a level of colonel or higher.  About $140 million for training
and equipping the National Guard (ICDC) and Facilities Protection
Service was appropriated in the FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-
106).  The September 2004 reallocation plans $442 million in
additional funds to for 20 additional Guard battalions (about 20,000
personnel).
! Iraqi Police Service (IPS).  Overall, about 42,000 Iraqi policemen
are trained and on duty, with the goal of 135,000 by June 2005.
Training is being conducted in Jordan, Iraq (including in Irbil in the
Kurdish region), and the United Arab Emirates (UAE); Jordan will
train about 35,000 of the total.  Police are paid $60 per month, and
must pass a background check ensuring they do not have a record of
human rights violations or criminal activity.  To train and equip the
police in the FY2004 supplemental request; $950 million was
provided in P.L. 108-106.  The September 2004 reallocation request
plans $788 million in additional funds for training 45,000 police.  A
new Civil Intervention force of the police has no current personnel
but is planned to have 4,900.  The Emergency Response Unit, also
part of the police, has 76 personnel of a planned 270.  Of the
September 2004 reallocation, $221 million is planned to go to the
Civil Intervention Force and related services
! Other forces include a new “Intervention Force,” which has 1,700
personnel on hand out of a planned 6,600; a “highway patrol,” with
600 personnel of a planned 1,500; and a “bureau of dignitary
protection,” with 445 personnel on hand of a planned 500.  No
longer considered a formal force is the former “Facilities Protection
Service,” a term used for the approximately 75,000  security guards
that protect installations such as oil pumping stations, electricity
substations, and government buildings.  
! Department of Border Enforcement.  To date, about 14,000 Iraqis
are trained or on hand in this force, of a goal of 32,000.  Members
of these forces receive a few weeks of training.  Of the September
2004 planned reallocations, $190 million is slated for this
department. 
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On November 21, 2003, the Bush Administration issued a determination
repealing a U.S. ban on arms exports to Iraq so that the United States can supply
weapons to the new Iraqi security institutions.  Authority to repeal this ban was
requested and granted in an FY2003 emergency supplemental appropriations (P.L.
108-11) for the costs of the war and was made subject to a determination that sales
to Iraq are “in the national interest.”  On July 21, 2004, the Administration
determined that Iraq would be treated as a friendly nation in evaluating U.S. arms
sales to Iraqi security forces and that such sales would be made in accordance with
the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act.  However, questions
have been raised about the slow pace of equipping the new Iraqi security institutions.
Lt. Gen. Petraeus said in September 2004 that about 39,000 weapons for the new
forces had been received since July 2004. 
Prime Minister Allawi has also placed a high priority on rebuilding a domestic
intelligence network.  On July 14, 2004, he announced the formation of a new
domestic intelligence agency (General Security Directorate) to infiltrate the insurgent
groups. 
“Internationalization” of the Effort.44  Some in and outside the Bush
Administration, including several Members and Democratic presidential nominee
John Kerry, believe that the United States should exert stronger efforts to enlist
greater international participation in peacekeeping, including giving up some of its
post-war governance influence, if required.  Those who advocate this option believe
it essential if the United States is to succeed in stabilizing Iraq and in reducing the
financial and military burden of the war — asserting that 90% of coalition casualties
in Iraq have been Americans.  As the insurgency escalated during 2003, the
Administration took steps in this direction, including inviting the United Nations to
play a greater role in organizing a post-Saddam transition.  The Bush Administration
is also supporting the holding of a conference on stabilizing Iraq, to be attended by
regional states and U.S. allies, scheduled for late November 2004 in Cairo.  
The Bush Administration asserts that it has consistently sought U.N. backing for
its post-war efforts, primarily to obtain international contributions to Iraq
peacekeeping.  Resolution 1483 (adopted unanimously May 6, 2003) provided for a
U.N. special representative to coordinate the activities of U.N. personnel in Iraq and
it “call[ed] on” governments to contribute forces for stabilization.  On August 14,
2003, the U.N. Security Council adopted a compromise resolution, Resolution 1500,
that “welcomed,” but did not “endorse,” the formation of the IGC.  The resolution
established a “U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq.”  In a further attempt to satisfy the
requirements of several major  nations, such as France, for a greater U.N. role in
post-Saddam Iraq, the United States obtained agreement on Resolution 1511
(adopted unanimously on October 16, 2003, and referenced above).  It authorized a
“multinational force under unified command.”  Resolution 1546 restated many of
these provisions.  However, some major potential force contributors as France,
Germany, Russia, India, and Pakistan have viewed these resolutions as insufficient
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to prompt their involvement on the grounds that they did not end what these countries
perceive as U.S. monopoly of decision-making on Iraq policy. 
The Bush Administration asserts that the United States has a large and strong
coalition,  pointing to the fact that 29 other countries are providing forces.  The total
of non-U.S. forces in Iraq is about 24,000.  The United Kingdom and Poland are
leading multinational divisions of about 10,000 forces each in southern Iraq and
central Iraq, respectively.  The UK-led force is based in Basra; the Poland-led force
is based in Hilla.  (On October 21, Britain announced that 850 of its force will deploy
to areas nearer to Baghdad to free up some U.S. forces for anti-insurgent combat in
Fallujah.)  Japan has deployed about 1,000 troops to Samawah, in southern Iraq, and
South Korea has completed a deployment of  3,000 troops to the Irbil area, where the
Kurds predominate.  (A list of countries performing peacekeeping can be found in
the Department of State’s “Iraq Weekly Status Report,” and in CRS Report
RL32105, Post-War Iraq: A Table and Chronology of Foreign Contributions.)  
In late July 2004, Secretary of State Powell said the United States would
consider a Saudi proposal for a contingent of troops from Muslim countries to
perform peacekeeping in Iraq, reportedly under separate command.  However, the
idea appears to have floundered due to opposition from potential contributing
countries such as Pakistan and reported Iraqi sensitivities to the potential for Muslim
foreign troops to meddle in Iraqi politics.  
Critics say that coalition countries are donating only about 15% of the total
U.S.-led coalition contingent in Iraq,  and they question the sustainment of even the
existing coalition.  Some  point to Spain’s May 2004 withdrawal of  its 1,300 troops
from Iraq as an indication that the Bush Administration effort to maintain an Iraq
coalition is faltering.  Spain made that decision following the March 11 Madrid
bombings and subsequent defeat of the former Spanish government that had
supported the war effort.  Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua
followed suit, withdrawing approximately 900 personnel, and the Philippines
withdrew in mid-July 2004 after one of its citizens was taken hostage and threatened
with beheading.  Thailand, New Zealand, and Norway are in the process of
withdrawing as well.  Poland is stretched by the $100 million per year cost of the Iraq
deployment; on October 5, 2004, Poland’s President said that he hoped Polish troops
could be withdrawn by next year.  Italian officials said in October 2004 that Italy
might withdraw after the planned January 2005 Iraqi elections. 
NATO.  One major issue in the debate over securing Iraq is the possibility of
greater NATO involvement.  Since mid-2003, NATO has been providing logistical
support to the international forces in Iraq led by Poland, but increased NATO
involvement was discussed at  every major NATO meeting since late 2003.  The
issue was discussed again at the  June 28-29, 2004, NATO summit in Istanbul, in
light of Prime Minister Allawi’s formal request for NATO assistance.  At the
summit, NATO agreed to provide training for Iraqi security forces, and up to 300
NATO trainers will deploy for that purpose; 40 of them are now in Iraq.  NATO’s top
commander, Gen. James Jones, said in October 2004 that the NATO training mission
could involve up to 3,000 troops.  Several major NATO states, such as France,
continue to oppose an actual NATO combat commitment to Iraq at this time.  
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On July 10, 2003, the Senate adopted an amendment, by a vote of 97-0, to a
State Department authorization bill (S. 925) calling on the Administration to formally
ask NATO to lead a peacekeeping force for Iraq.  A related bill (H.R. 2112) was
introduced in the House on May 15, 2003.  (For more information on this possibility,
see CRS Report RL32068, An Enhanced European Role in Iraq?) 
Altering U.S. Force Levels.  Others believe that some major potential force
contributors are unlikely to send forces to Iraq, and that the United States should
increase its own  troops in Iraq in an all-out effort to defeat the insurgents.  Some
believe that greater internationalization of the effort would likely confuse the post-
war command structure.  The Bush Administration has said that U.S. field
commanders will be provided with more troops, if needed, and that senior
commanders say existing force levels are sufficient to perform the U.S. mission.
Some believe that increasing U.S. force levels would further the impression in Iraq
that the interim government is beholden to the United States for its survival.  
A minority of commentators argue that the United States should withdraw
immediately.  Those who take this position tend to argue that the decision to invade
Iraq and change its regime was a mistake in light of the failure thus far to locate
WMD.  Others believe that Iraq cannot be stabilized and that a continued U.S.
presence in Iraq will result in additional U.S. casualties without securing U.S.
national interests.  Critics of this view say the Iraqi interim government would
collapse quickly if the United States pulled out suddenly, harming U.S. credibility
internationally and enabling Iraq to become a haven for terrorists. 
Rejuvenating Iraq’s Economy
The Administration asserts that, despite the ongoing insurgency, economic
reconstruction is progressing.  Administration officials  say that life has returned to
normal in most of Iraq, that Iraq’s economy is recovering, and that many Iraqis are
demonstrating their confidence by  buying automobiles and appliances.  Electricity
has been restored to above pre-war levels (80,000 Megawatt Hours), although
resistance attacks continue to reduce power to 9-15  hours per day in most of Iraq.
Sanitation, health care, and education are a few of the indicators that are improving
statistically.  About 3 million Iraqi children have been vaccinated since Saddam fell.
A new currency has been introduced and has remained stable since introduction in
early 2004.  On the other hand, insurgent attacks have slowed oil exports, and some
surveys and studies say reconstruction has not proceeded to the point at which most
Iraqis are pleased with the progress thus far.45  In September 2004, the State
Department finished a review of how to spend U.S.  funds to accelerate
reconstruction, and it decided to shift its focus to smaller scale projects that could
quickly employ Iraqis and yield concrete benefits.  
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The Oil Industry.  As the driver of Iraq’s economy, the rebuilding of the oil
industry has received substantial U.S. attention.  Before the war, it was widely
assumed that Iraq’s vast oil reserves, believed second only to those of Saudi Arabia,
would fund much, if not all, reconstruction costs.  Then presidential spokesman Ari
Fleischer said on February 18, 2003, referring to Iraq’s oil reserves, that Iraq has “a
variety of means...to shoulder much of the burden for [its] own reconstruction.”  The
oil industry infrastructure suffered little damage during the U.S.-led invasion (only
about 9 oil wells were set on fire), but it has become a target of insurgents.  
In May 2003, the CPA set up an advisory board, headed by former Shell
executive Phillip Carroll, to oversee the rebuilding of Iraq’s oil sector.  The first
exports began in late June 2003, and increased gradually to about 1.8 million barrels
per day (mbd) by April 2004.  (Pre-war levels were 2.2 mbd.)  However, in October
2004, exports have averaged only about 1.44 million mbd, although production is
2.36 mbd, near the pre-war peak of 2.5 mbd.  Exports have been halted almost
entirely on some days because of insurgent attacks on oil pipelines and related
facilities.  Thus far in 2004, Iraq has earned about $13.5 billion from oil exports.  The
FY2004 supplemental appropriations,  P.L. 108-106, provided $1.2 billion to repair
Iraq’s oil infrastructure, plus $700 million to import refined energy products that
Iraq’s infrastructure cannot produce.  In January 2004, the Administration redirected
some funds for energy importation to local governance.
A related issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry and which
foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s
vast reserves.  Russia, China, and others are said to fear that the United States will
seek to develop Iraq’s oil industry with minimal participation of firms from other
countries.  Iraq’s interim government has contracted for a study of the extent of Iraq’s
oil reserves, and it has contracted with Royal Dutch/Shell to formulate a blueprint to
develop the gas sector. 
CPA Budget/DFI/U.S. Funding.46  At inception, the Development Fund for
Iraq (DFI), set up by Resolution 1483 (May 6, 2003) as the repository for Iraq’s
revenue, contained about $7 billion when it was established in June 2003.  Controlled
by the CPA during the occupation period and now run by the Iraqi government (as
specified in Resolution 1546), the DFI receives funds from captured Iraqi assets, Iraqi
assets held abroad, the monies transferred from the close-out of the “oil-for-food
program,” revenues from oil and other exports, and revenues from other sources such
as taxes, user fees, and returns from profits on state-owned enterprises.  In late
October 2003, a multilateral board to monitor the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI),
mandated by Resolution 1483, was established (the International Advisory and
Monitoring Board, IAMB).  It has hired KPMG as external auditor.  The IAMB met
in late June 2004 and identified some possible problems in how the DFI was
administered, and it produced the first formal audit on July 15, 2004.  A KPMG
report produced in October 2004 identified several examples of CPA
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mismanagement of the DFI and possible corruption in some cases.47  The DFI was
held in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, not Iraq’s Central Bank, during the
occupation period. 
In order to accelerate reconstruction, Iraq was deemed to require international
donations, such as those pledged at the October 23-24, 2003 donors’ conference in
Madrid, additional U.S. appropriations, and funds remaining after the U.N.-run “oil
for food program” terminated on November 21, 2003 (see below).  A World Bank
estimate, released in early October 2003, said Iraq reconstruction would require about
$56 billion during 2004-2007, including the $20 billion in U.S. funding requested by
the Administration in September 2003.  At the Madrid donors conference, donors
pledged about $4 billion in grants and $9 billion in credits, in addition to the $20
billion to be provided by the United States.  A third donors’ meeting was held in
Tokyo during October 13-14, 2004, with commitments by donors to accelerated
payments on existing pledges.  Iran joined as a donor country, pledging $10 million.
(For  information on international pledges, see CRS Report RL32015, Post-War Iraq:
A Table and Chronology of Foreign Contributions.)  
Supplemental U.S. Funding.  In part to meet the requirements for funding,
an FY2003 supplemental, P.L. 108-11, appropriated about $2.5 billion for Iraq
reconstruction.  When oil revenues continued to lag, U.S. officials decided to ask
Congress  for another supplemental appropriation.  On September 8, 2003, President
Bush requested supplemental funding for FY2004 for the “war on terrorism,” in the
amount of $87 billion, of which over $70 billion would be for military operations in
and reconstruction of Iraq.  Of that amount, about $50 billion would be for military
costs and about $20 billion for reconstruction of Iraq.  
The FY2004 supplemental appropriation (conf. report H.Rept. 108-337, P.L.
108-106) provided the following funds for Iraq reconstruction (total $18.7 billion):
! $3.243 billion for security and law enforcement, including the New
Iraqi Army, border enforcement, and other security functions;
! $1.32 billion for justice and civil society and democracy
development, including programs for women and youth and the
formation of an independent human rights commission,
! $5.56 billion for electricity infrastructure rehabilitation,
! $1.89 billion for rehabilitating the energy infrastructure,
! $4.332 billion to repair water and sewage systems;
! $500 million for repair of transportation and telecommunications
infrastructure,
! $370 million to upgrade housing, roads, and bridges,
! $800 million to construct and equip hospitals and clinics, and
! $453 million for education, jobs training, and private sector
initiatives.
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The continuing violence has slowed spending on reconstruction.  As of October
2004, of the $21.2 billion in the FY2003 and FY2004 supplementals, about $10.5
billion has been obligated.  Of that, about $3.25 billion has been disbursed.  In
September 2004, the Administration asked Congress for approval to reallocate $3.46
billion of the appropriated funds.  The $3.46 billion to be reassigned would come
from funds taken from those previously allocated purchases of refined energy
products, for water and sewerage and electrical reconstruction.  Because some of the
funds added to some categories of activities would exceed ceilings set in P.L. 108-
106, the Administration asked for legislation to approve the reprogramming; the
approval was granted in a continuing resolution on FY2005 appropriations.
FY2005.  No new funds for Iraq reconstruction were requested in the
Administration’s budget for FY2005, released on February 2, 2004.  As noted above,
reconstruction spending is slower than expected, and already appropriated funds will
likely be sufficient for the near term.  A FY2005 supplemental appropriation of $25
billion will be used mostly for military costs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and additional
military funds for the Iraq war effort will be required in early 2005, according to
deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. 
Lifting of U.S. Sanctions.  The Bush Administration has lifted most U.S.
sanctions on Iraq, beginning with several Presidential Determinations easing
sanctions under authorities provided by  P.L. 108-7 (consolidated appropriations for
FY2003) and P.L. 108-11 (FY2003 supplemental appropriations).  On July 30, 2004,
President Bush issued an executive order formally ending the package of sanctions
imposed on Iraq following the 1990 invasion of Kuwait.  Those measures were
contained in Executive Order 12722 (August 2, 1990) and 12724 (August 9, 1990),
issued after Iraq’s August 2, 1990, invasion of Kuwait.  They  imposed a ban on U.S.
trade with and investment in Iraq and froze Iraq’s assets in the United States.  The
Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (Section 586 of P.L. 101-513, signed November 5, 1990)
reinforced those executive orders.  On September 8, 2004, the President designated
Iraq a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), enabling Iraqi
products to have duty free tariff treatment for entry into the United States.  As noted
above, on September 24, 2004, Iraq was removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors
of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (P.L. 96-72).
Therefore, Iraq is no longer barred under that section from receiving U.S. foreign
assistance, U.S. votes in favor of international loans, and sales of munitions list items
(arms and related equipment and services).  As a result of the removal of Iraq from
the list, exports of dual use items (items that can have military applications) are no
longer subject to strict licensing procedures.  However, a May 7, 2003 executive
order left in place the provisions of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act (P.L.
102-484); that act imposes sanctions on persons or governments that export
technology that would contribute to any Iraqi advanced conventional arms capability
or weapons of mass destruction programs.  The July 30, 2004, order does not
unfreeze any assets in the United States determined to belong to the former regime.
Termination of the Oil-for-Food Program.  In accordance with the
provisions of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003), the U.N.-run
oil-for-food program ended November 21, 2003.  The close-out of residual contacts
under the program is now run by the interim Iraqi government.  See CRS Report
RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, Sanctions, and Illicit Trade.
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Debt Relief.  The Administration is attempting to relieve Iraq’s debt burden
built up during the regime of Saddam Hussein.  The debt is estimated to total about
$116 billion, not including reparations dating to the first Persian Gulf war.  In
September 2004, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a loan to Iraq of
$436 million for reconstruction, and indicated it plans about $4 billion in further
lending to Iraq.  The loan came one week after Iraq cleared up $81 million in arrears
to the Fund dating from Saddam Hussein’s regime.  For more information, see CRS
Report RS21765, Iraq: Paris Club Debt Relief. 
Congressional Reactions
Congress, like the Administration, had divergent views on the  mechanisms for
promoting regime change, although there was widespread agreement in Congress that
regime change should be a major U.S. policy goal for Iraq.  On December 20, 2001,
the House passed H.J.Res. 75, by a vote of 392-12, calling Iraq’s refusal to readmit
U.N. weapons inspectors a “mounting threat” to the United States.  The resolution
did not call for new U.S. steps to overthrow Saddam Hussein but a few Members
called for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in their floor statements in support of
the resolution.  In early 2002, prior to the intensified speculation about possible war
with Iraq, some Members expressed support for increased aid to the opposition. As
discussion of potential military action increased in the fall of 2002, Members debated
the costs and risks of an invasion of Iraq.  Congress adopted  H.J.Res. 114,
authorizing the President to use military force against Iraq if he determines that doing
so is in the national interest and would enforce U.N. Security Council resolutions on
Iraq.  The measure passed the House on October 11, 2002 by  a vote of 296-133, and
the Senate the following day by a vote of 77-23.  The legislation was signed into law
on October 16, 2002 (P.L. 107-243).
The 108th Congress has held numerous hearings on post-Saddam Iraq and, as
noted above, has appropriated reconstruction and military funding for the Iraq effort.
Although Congress has applauded the performance of the U.S. military and the
overthrow of the regime, several Members have criticized the Administration for
inadequate planning for the post-war period.  Criticism has escalated as attacks on
U.S. occupation forces have mounted, and some Members have offered suggestions
to stabilize Iraq, including adding U.S. forces, ceding a larger role to the United
Nations, or allowing time for existing policies to achieve stability.  Several
committees are conducting inquiries into why substantial amounts of WMD have not
been found in Iraq to date, and hearings have been held alleged abuses of the U.N.-
run oil-for-food program and the abuses at Abu Ghuraib prison.  Some Members who
have visited Iraq — and over one third of Members have visited Iraq since the fall of
Saddam — say reconstruction is proceeding and that Iraq is more stable than is
widely portrayed in the press.48
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Appendix. U.S. Assistance to the Opposition
Appropriated Economic Support Funds (E.S.F.) 
to the Opposition
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Notes:  The figures above do not include defense articles and services provided under the Iraq
Liberation Act.  The figures provided above also do not include any covert aid provided, the amounts
of which are not known from open sources.  In addition, during each of FY2001 and FY2002, the
Administration has donated $4 million to a “U.N. War Crimes Commission” fund, to be used if a war








I r a n
I r a q
S a u d i  A r a b i a
S y r i a
T u r k e y
Az Zubayr
Suq Ash Shuyukh
Al Majarr Al Kabir




Ar Rutbah Al Mahmudiyah Sal Man Pak


































Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (K.Yancey 7/21/04)
Figure 1.  Map of Iraq
